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Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has made significant progress in democracy and economic 
performance since mid-1990s, but the continent remains by far the poorest region in 
the world. This dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 reviews SSA’s 
history of democracy and economic policy since independence, including a literature 
review. It argues that while SSA’s disappointing economic performance is, in part, 
due to its difficult geography, high incidence of disease, and colonial legacy, the main 
reason for Africa’s woes until mid-1990s seem to be the failure of economic policies 
adopted by most SSA governments after independence. Chapter 2 examines SSA’s 
recent economic growth acceleration, and finds that such acceleration is mainly due 
to better institutions and policies adopted by most SSA governments (as a result of 
more open and democratic societies), as well as lower incidence of armed conflicts, 
whereas the role of aid and terms of trade is relatively limited. Chapter 3 reviews the 
impact on fiscal policy of competitive presidential elections in SSA during 1980-
2005, and finds that (i) the magnitude of political budget cycles has declined over 
time as a result of stronger checks and balances and more experienced electorates; 
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Chapter 1: History of Electoral and Economic Policy in SSA 
Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remains by far the poorest region in the world. To a 
considerable extent this reflects its difficult geography, harsh climate, and high 
incidence of disease. At the same time, the colonial rule also held Africa back, 
leaving it at independence severely deprived of human and physical capital, as well as 
functioning institutions. The great push for the colonization of Africa that occurred in 
late-19
th
 century, centuries after the colonization by Europeans of Asia and Western 
Hemisphere, meant that the colonial powers had better bureaucracies and thus less 
need to rely on indigenous institutions. As a result, the colonial state in SSA was a 
pure model of alien bureaucratic autocracy. The colonial administration was almost 
entirely in the hands of Europeans, and, at independence, most SSA countries could 
count only a handful of native college graduates.  
Until the mid-1990s there was profound pessimism about SSA prospects. This 
reflected growing refugee problems, spectacular cases of state decay and collapse, 
and systematic violence (particularly Liberia, Somalia, and Rwanda), contributing to 
Africa’s increasing economic marginalization. Because of low growth and rising 
income inequality since independence, SSA entered the 21
st
 century with many of the 
world’s poorest countries, and an average income per capita is lower than at the end 
of the 1960s (World Bank, 2000).  
While SSA’s colonial history and adverse geography were highly influential, its poor 
economic performance was mainly due to the choice of the political systems and 
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disastrous economic policies adopted by post-colonial governments.  The dynamics 
of remaining behind are perverse. Low growth undermines middle class formation, 
education is neglected as a result of lack of public funds, capital flight becomes the 
norm, and the migration is primarily from those that are most educated draining 
human capital. This feeds into weaker governance, which feeds into lower growth, 
and so on. The cost of these failed policies eventually disrupts the political order. This 
is exactly what happened across SSA during the 1970s and late-1980s. 
Since mid-1990s, however, economic growth in SSA has accelerated rapidly and now 
Africa’s prospects look much brighter. This seems to reflect mainly the impact of 
economic reforms and dramatic political liberalization that accelerated in the early- 
1990s. The mutually reinforcing effects between political freedom and economic 
development are well established. Roll and Talbott (2003), for example, found that 
among the most significant factors in explaining variations in per capita national 
income at the global level during the 1990s were several different measures of 
freedom, including political rights, civil liberties, press freedom, and property rights. 
Easterly (2001) also found that Africa’s higher government budget deficits, higher 
financial repression, and higher black market premium explain about half of the 
growth difference between East Asia and Africa over the past three decades. Within 
Africa, Eifert (2003) found that the difference in political openness between the most 
and least democratic African state is associated with a growth gap of over 4½ 
percentage points per year.   
Against this background, this chapter provides a summary of history of electoral and 
economic policy in SSA, including a literature review. The discussion in the 
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remainder of this chapter focuses mainly on commonalities among SSA countries, so 
as to set the stage for the next two chapters. Before proceeding further, however, it is 
worth noting that there were significant differences among SSA countries in terms of 
their institutional structure at independence, mainly as a result of colonial legacy. As 
discussed in Young (1994), for example, countries under the British rule developed 
less uniformly in the superstructure of the colonial state, as a result of a less 
prefectoral model of regional administration. The French colonies were at the other 
extreme, with a more unified chain of command extending from the governor down to 
the village level through a single hierarchy, reflecting the potent legacy of the 
absolutist Bonapartist tradition on the state. Such differences shaped the institution at 
independence across SSA. The colonial legacy also affected economic policy in the 
post-independence period. Twelve former French colonies, for example, adopted the 
CFA franc in 1945, which constrained their fiscal policies in a way that was not the 
case in the rest of Africa. At a fundamental level, however, SSA countries were very 
similar to each other. In particular, as discussed above, because of the fact that the 
colonial state in SSA was a pure model of alien bureaucratic autocracy, and that most 
SSA countries could count only a handful of native college graduates at 
independence, the state forming capabilities in most SSA countries were quite 
limited, and their capitalist systems very embryonic. 
Democracy and Elections in SSA: A Historical Perspective 
At the risk of painting developments across SSA with a broad brush, the history of 
democratic movements and elections in SSA can be grouped in three waves: (i) the 
first wave started to gain steam gradually since the end of World War II and 
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culminated with independence movements in the late 1950s, resulting in 
independence from colonial powers in the 1960s for most SSA countries, and in the 
1970s for the remainder; (ii) the second wave was in the period between 
independence and late-1980s; and (iii) the third wave coincided with the global move 
towards democracy in late-1980s. The first and third waves were more or less 
synchronized across SSA, whereas the second wage resulted in intermittent 
democratic systems in particular countries that were quickly replaced extra-legally by 
civilian ―strong men‖ or military rulers. 
While these three waves characterize the experience with democracy in the vast 
majority of SSA countries, there are two notable exceptions—Botswana and 
Mauritious that have been continuously democratic since gaining independence. Both 
countries had founding leaders that, unlike in the other SSA countries, agreed to 
conduct their political competition in the post-independence period within the 
boundaries of democratic rule, ensured broad representation (a key factor given SSA 
ethnical diversity), and enacted policies that were supportive of economic growth. 
These favorable outcomes provided support for the political system, creating in turn a 
virtuous cycle (see section on the history of economic policies in SSA).   
First Wave: End of World War II to Independence  
International hostility to colonial rule and anticolonial movements within SSA 
intensified after World War II. As a result, colonial powers were forced to start 
opening the formerly exclusionary institutions of rule to indigenous participation. The 
combination of powerful international and domestic forces converged to create the 
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initial African wave—leading to independence of SSA from colonial powers starting 
in the mid-1950s and accelerating in the 1960s. Of the 47 SSA countries listed in 
Table I.1, 37 of them had become independent by 1970, and the independence 
movement continued in earnest during the 1970s, with Zimbabwe in 1980 being the 
last country to gain independence from colonial powers in SSA. Multiparty elections 
were held soon after independence in most countries (33 out of 47 countries). In the 
other countries, which included a few cases where independence was won by armed 
struggle rather than negotiations (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, 
and Sao Tome and Principe), no multiparty elections were held until the third 
democratization wave (see below). 
Second wave: Independence to late-1980s/early-1990s 
The electoral democracy in SSA that followed the first wave was short lived. The 
doctrine of the mass single party as the vanguard of African progress soon took root, 
embraced by the most charismatic leaders of the independence generation (Joseph 
1999). These leaders argued that competitive democracy was a luxury that poor 
countries could not afford, and concentration of authority would facilitate the needed 
economic leapfrog through a state-led development model.  
During this period, the political systems in Africa became overwhelmingly 
authoritarian. The political order that emerged was, in most cases, that of a dominant 
party, which was able to integrate, co-opt, or eliminate other political parties, and 
ultimately install a single-party rule. In these one-party states, political power became 
highly centralized around the President (de Walle 2001). Within a few years 
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following independence, the armies of Benin, Madagascar, Sudan, Togo, and Congo 
(Brazzaville) overthrew their civilian leaders. This trend accelerated during the 1960s 
and 1970s. By 1970, for example, only nine SSA countries – or only 25 percent of 
those that had achieved political independence – retained competitive systems (Bates 
in Collier et. al., 2008). Furthermore, by mid-1980s, about half of African regimes 
were military (16) or quasi military (7), another third (15) had one party states or 
hereditary monarchies, and only 5 countries having multiparty systems (Sandbrook 
1985). Even in these latter cases, the tolerance of the party in power to opposition was 
untested. 
As a result, elections in Africa soon after independence were depicted as empty and 
largely symbolic exercises designed to legitimate office holders. Between 
independence and 1989 there were 106 presidential and 185 direct parliamentary 
elections in 47 SSA countries. As noted in Bratton and de Walle (1997), in the 
presidential elections the winner got on average 92 percent of the votes, and the 
opposition candidate got more than a quarter of the votes in only 10 cases. The 
margin of victory was smaller, though not by much, in parliamentary elections – with 
the winning party getting on average 83 percent of the vote. As discussed above, only 
Botswana and Mauritious were exceptions, where reasonably free and fair elections 
were held on a regular basis, although, even in these two countries, there has not yet 
been any alternation of power. 
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Angola 1975 No One party state 1975-91. Multiparty presidential election in 1992, but no election since.
Benin 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1965-90. Return to democracy in 1991, with multiparty elections.
Botswana 1966 Yes Continously democratic. Continously democratic.
Burkina Faso 1960 No Military regime or one party state in 1960-91, with brief democracy 1978-80. Multiparty elections since 1991.
Burundi 1962 Yes Military regime or one party state 1966-92. Multiparty elections since 1992, with temporary military rule in 1996.
Cameroon 1960 Yes One party state 1966-90. Multiparty elections since 1991.
Cape Verde 1975 No One party state 1975-90. Multiparty elections since 1991.
Central African Republic 1960 No Military regime or one party state 1962-91, expect for a brief period in 1981. Multiparty elections since 1992, with brief military rule 2003-05.
Chad 1960 No Military regime or one party state 1962-93, with democratic transition in 1994. Multiparty elections since 1997.
Comoros 1975 No Multiparty elections in 1978, but one party state 1982-90. Multiparty elections since 1990, with military regime 1999-2002.
Congo, Democratic Republic of 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1966-90. Democratic transition 1991-2005. Multiparty elections in 2006.
Congo, Republic of 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1963-90. Multiparty elections since 1991, with civil war 1997-2002.
Cȏte d'Ivoire 1960 No One party state 1960-90. Multiparty elections since 1991, with brief military rule in 1999-2000.
Equatorial Guinea 1968 Yes Military regime or one party state 1970-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Eritrea 1993 No N/A. One party state since independence from Ethiopia in 1993.
Ethiopia 1941 No Traditional monarchy, military regime or one party state 1941-94. Multiparty elections since 1994.
Gabon 1960 Yes One party state 1968-90, with democratic transition 1991-93.. Multiparty elections since 1993.
The Gambia 1965 Yes Democracy 1965-94. Multiparty elections since 1996, following military rule 1994-95.
Ghana 1957 Yes Military regime or one party state 1964-92, with brief democracy 1979-81. Multiparty elections since 1992.
Guinea 1958 Yes Military regime or one party state 1958-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Guinea-Bissau 1974 No Military regime or one party state 1974-94. Multiparty elections since 1994.
Kenya 1963 Yes One party state 1969-92. Multiparty elections since 1992.
Lesotho 1966 Yes Military regime or one party state 1970-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Liberia 1847 Yes One party state 1878-1990. Multiparty elections in 1985 and since 1997.
Madagaskar 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1972-92. Multiparty elections since 1992.
Malawi 1964 No One party state 1964-94. Multiparty elections since 1994.
Mali 1960 No One party state 1960-92. Multiparty elections since 1992.
Mauritania 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1961-92. Multiparty elections since 1992.
Mauritius 1968 Yes Continously democratic. Continously democratic.
Mozambique 1975 No One party state 1975-94. Multiparty elections since 1994.
Namibia 1990 Yes N/A. Continously democratic.
Niger 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1961-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Nigeria 1960 Yes Military regime 1966-99, except for democracy rule in 1979-83. Multiparty elections since 1999.
Rwanda 1962 Yes Military regime of one party state 1965-2003. Multiparty elections since 2003.
Sao Tome and Principe 1975 No One party state 1975-91. Multiparty elections since 1991.
Senegal 1960 Yes One party state in 1966-78, and multiparty elections otherwise. Multiparty elections since 1978.
Seychelles 1976 Yes One party state 1977-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Sierra Leone 1961 Yes Military regime 1967-68, and one party state 1978-91, democracy otherwise. Military regime 1992-98, with multiparty elections since 1998.
Somalia 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state since 1969. No government 1991-2000, and transitional government since 2001.
South Africa 1910 Yes Democracy resricted to whites only until 1994. Multiparty elections without restrictions since 1994.
Sudan 1956 Yes Military regime or one party state, except democracy 1965-69 and 1986-89. Military regime 1989-93 and one party state 1993-99.
Swaiziland 1968 Yes Traditional monarchy since 1973. Traditional monarchy since 1973.
Tanzania 1961 Yes One party state 1962-95. Multiparty elections since 1995.
Togo 1960 Yes Military regime or one party state 1963-93. Multiparty elections since 1993.
Uganda 1962 Yes Military regime or one party state 1969-2006, except limited democracy 1980-85. Multiparty elections since 2006.
Zambia 1964 Yes One party state 1972-91. Multiparty elections since 1991.
Zimbabwe 1980 Yes Restricted democracy since 1987. Restricted democracy since 1987.
Source: 
Phase One




While outside Botswana and Mauritious some SSA countries allowed limited competition by 
holding relatively competitive primaries within the ruling party—such as in Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Zambia in the 1970s, and Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo in the 1980s—in 
essence such elections did not threaten the monopoly on power of the strong men at the top. 
Even in the few cases that opposition won in SSA elections during this period, the Parliament 
was dissolved extra-legally within a couple of years (Bratton and de Walle 1997).  
There were some early successes in the immediate post-independence period, including 
limited economic growth, increased urbanization, emergence of a national middle class, and 
above all, development of sense of nationhood (Boadi 2004). However, the perils of 
―development dictatorships‖ in single-party states were soon made clear, as the ensuing 
autocracy that took place in many SSA created some of the most extreme cases of tyrants – 
Idi Amin in Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokassa in the Central African Republic, and Macias 
Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. As a result of the abuses that followed the creation of this 
―monopoly state‖ and, more importantly, the economic failures that these systems produced, 
the ideological formulas that justified the exclusion and marginalization of the subject 
population started to gradually lose force toward late-1970s and early-1980s. While there 
were several instances of restored democratic rule in SSA, during this period, as noted earlier 
those proved ephemeral until the worldwide wave of democratic reforms of the late-1990s. In 
Ghana, for example, there was democratic rule in 1969-71 and also in 1979-81. Nigeria also 
in 1979 was returned to democratic rule, but the colossal scale of venality and election 
rigging led to a return to military rule in 1983.  
The donors pushed for economic reforms in SSA starting in the early-1980s, conditioning 
their external assistance on such reforms. However, these reforms failed to bring a quick 
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economic recovery in Africa. As a result, there were growing voices within the continent that 
political reform was a necessary concomitant of economic liberalization. There was a 
growing recognition that without a re-moralization of public institutions, and minimal 
accountability and transparency, economic liberalization was destined to fail and could thus 
not be sustained. 
Third wave: Late-1980s to Late-1990s 
The early 1990s saw a wave of competitive multiparty elections in SSA, marking a transition 
from an extended period of authoritarian rule to a new era of fledging democratic 
government. The economic reforms that were introduced during the 1980s to address dismal 
economic performance and worsening economic conditions were not successful in most 
cases (see section on the history of economic policies in SSA for a description), and, as a 
result, by the late 1980s many regimes in Africa were undergoing a legitimacy crisis. 
Democratic movements that hit Africa in the early 1990s started as economic protests against 
the incumbent governments. Although not specifically political when they began, these 
protests quickly escalated into demands for regime change (de Walle, 2001). 
These democratic movements were, in part, supported by growing international recognition 
on the need for a new development paradigm. In the post-Cold War era, simply professing 
ideological preferences was no longer enough to earn financial support from donors. In order 
to obtain development assistance, SSA countries had to show willingness to observe human 




However, while the international conjecture was clearly important for democratic reforms, 
they seem to have played only a supportive role. Bratton and de Walle (1997), for example, 
argue that while international aid donors became major players in the game of regime 
transition after 1989, particularly when they began to wield the carrots and sticks of political 
conditionality, they helped to create the conditions under which political change became 
possible, but did not in themselves trigger or sustain regime transitions or determine the 
directions the transitions took. Instead, they argue, the onset and subsequent trajectory of 
regime transition depended on the constellation of domestic political forces, and reflected the 
home grown discontent from economic failure and political oppression. Bates (in Collier et. 
al., 2008) also finds support for the primary role of domestic factors in the path toward 
political reform. He finds, for example, that the greater the percent of adult population who 
were literate, and the higher the average income, the more likely that the authoritarian regime 
would fall.  
Democratic reforms in SSA during this period were dramatic and swift. As shown in Table 
I.2, while during the period 1985-89, competitive multiparty elections were held only in nine 
SSA countries, the number of African countries holding competitive elections increased to 38 
during the period 1989-94 (more than ¾ of SSA countries). Of these, 29 were founding 
elections, and by 1994 not a single de-jure one-party state remained in Africa (Bratton and de 
Walle, 1997). Benin’s multiparty elections in 1991 were the first instance in mainland Africa 
when a national leader was peacefully supplanted as a consequence of the expressed will of 
the people. This was followed by another 13 similar leadership transitions in the first five 
years of democratic reforms in Africa (i.e., between 1990 and 1994). As a result, the share of 
peaceful transitions in SSA increased to 60 percent of cases of incumbent exits during the 
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period 1990-94, compared to about 40 percent during the 1980s, and less than 20 percent 
during the 1970s (Collier, 2008).  
 However, despite the leadership alternation in some SSA countries in the first five years as 
noted above (14), an equal number of long-standing incumbent leaders in other countries (15) 
managed to survive multi-party elections. Of the 15 incumbents who retained office, 12 did 
so in elections that fell short of internationally accepted standards (Bratton and de Walle 
1997). Moreover, in most cases incumbent rulers openly manipulated constitutional and 
electoral rules to trip up their competitors. As a result, the quality of elections in Africa in the 
early years of this period varied, and in most countries the prime purpose of elections 
remained the legitimation of whatever regime currently holds political power (Joseph 1999). 
In addition, using privileged access to government revenue, rulers bought votes. In Kenya, 
for example, Moi’s administration increased money supply by 35 percent in 1992 to spur 
growth in the months before general elections (see Chapter 3 for an analysis on political 
budget cycles in SSA). Even in the cases where the leader was changed, in most cases they 
came from the same social and political class as before, including some who had served in 
the colonial regime.  
In addition, elections alone do not create functioning democracies, and, many African states 
that moved to free elections, did not immediately fortify the basic democratic tenets. Several 
factors stood in the way, including the incongruence between Western electoral systems and 
Africa’s ethnic politics (World Bank, 2000). Since a large fraction of the population in many 
SSA countries defines itself largely in terms of ethnic kinship, open elections politicized the 
significant regional, ethnic, religious and racial divisions, adding to disintegrative pressures 
on fragile states (Joseph 1999).  
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Such divisions escalated to widespread violence in some cases, such as in Rwanda, Burundi, 
and Congo-Brazzaville (the civil strife in Somalia and Sudan are not related to democratic 
movements). These instances underscore the need for acknowledging, rather than ignoring 
cultural pluralism in the SSA societies, and that competitive elections are necessary but not 
sufficient for democracy to function (Collier, 2007).  
Many scholars were critical of these early developments. Bratton (1998), for example, argued 
that Africa had returned to neopatrimonial politics, whereas others saw a continuation of 
disorder and destructive politics (Chabal and Daloz, 1999), no change at all (Akinrinade, 
1998), political closure (Joseph, 1999), semi-authoritarianism (Carothers, 1997), or elections 
without democracy (de Walle, 2001). 
Yet, even with considerable flaws in the early African multiparty elections of this period, in 
most cases civil society breathed easier after partial liberalization, and the political climate 
became increasingly less fear-ridden and less closed than when it first started in the late 
1980s. The changes since early 1990s made Africa significantly less autocratic, even if it 
remained largely neopatrimonial. The unprecedented surge in civil society, including in the 
media, was a key development in the current African political renewal. Relaxation of media 
censorship paved the way for the emergence of independent newspapers, radio, and 
television, which were widely credited for the relatively honest elections in many countries 
(e.g., Senegal and Ghana – Boadi 2004). Also, as the scheduling elections became more 
regular, voting became increasingly meaningful (evidenced by greater voter participation in 
elections), and appeared to have a greater impact on the selection of representatives for 
Parliament (Boadi 2004). 
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As of 2005, there had been founding elections in all SSA countries except Eritrea, Swaziland 
(which is a kingdom), and Zimbabwe (see Chapter 3). Multiparty elections had led to 34 
alternations of political leaders, although no alternation of the leader had taken place in 15 
SSA countries, out of 37 SSA countries that elect the leader in direct popular elections. In 
addition, while in over two third of SSA countries the democracy is slowly moving forward, 
in about a third there has been a regression in democratic qualities. For example, Niger has 
had numerous regime breakdowns and struggled through multiple military coups, Zimbabwe 
has not have a free and fair multiparty presidential election yet, and the Republic Democratic 
of Congo has also had challenges to maintain political stability.  
With the passage of time, however, democracy in SSA is consolidating, and the magnitude of 
political budget cycles has also declined significantly in recent years (see Chapter 3). 
Reviewing democratic qualities of elections in Africa during 1989-2003, Lindberg (2006) 
finds that contrary to a number of earlier studies, more than half of all elections in Africa 
during this period were free and fair, and the overall trend is stability or even slightly 
positive. In particular, there is statistically significant improvement in the legitimacy of 
elections. Lindberg argues that the elections in Africa have had a self-reinforcing effect, i.e., 
once regimes hold their second elections, they tend to survive, and that the regime 
breakdown almost always occurs after the first election. At the same time, however, he also 
finds no relationship between the quality of elections and the survival of electoral regimes, 















Angola 1992 No 0 No 0
Benin 1991 Yes 3 Yes (2) 3
Botswana 1/ None None None None None
Burkina Faso 1991 No 2 No 0
Burundi 1993 Yes 0 No 1
Cameroon 1992 No 2 No 0
Cape Verde 1991 Yes 2 Yes (1) 2
Central African Republic 1993 Yes 2 No 1
Chad 1996 No 2 No 0
Comoros 1990 No 3 Yes (1) 1
Congo, Democratic Republic of 2006 No 0 No 0
Congo, Republic of 1992 Yes 1 No 1
Cȏte d'Ivoire 1990 No 2 Yes (1) 1
Equatorial Guinea 1996 No 1 No 0
Eritrea None None None None None
Ethiopia 1/ None None None None None
Gabon 1993 No 2 No 0
The Gambia 1982 No 4 No 0
Ghana 1992 No 3 Yes (1) 1
Guinea 1993 No 2 No 0
Guinea-Bissau 1994 No 2 Yes (2) 2
Kenya 1992 No 2 Yes (1) 1
Lesotho None None None None None
Liberia 1997 Yes 1 Yes (1) 2
Madagascar 1992 Yes 2 Yes (2) 3
Malawi 1994 Yes 2 No 1
Mali 1992 Yes 2 Yes (1) 2
Mauritania 1992 Yes 2 No 1
Mauritius 1/ None None None None None
Mozambique 1994 No 2 No 0
Namibia 1994 No 2 No 0
Niger 1993 Yes 3 Yes (2) 3
Nigeria 1999 Yes 1 No 1
Rwanda 2003 No 0 No 0
Sao Tome and Principe 1991 Yes 2 No 1
Senegal 1978 No 4 Yes (1) 1
Seychelles 1993 No 2 No 3
Sierra Leone 1996 Yes 1 No 1
Somalia None None None None None
South Africa None None None None None
Sudan None None None None None
Swaiziland None None None None None
Tanzania 1995 No 2 No 0
Togo 1993 No 3 No 0
Uganda 1996 No 2 No 0
Zambia 1991 Yes 2 No 1
Zimbabwe None None None None None
Source:
1/ Botswana and Mauritius have had democratic parliamentary elections since independence, but do 
not elect the president directly. Ethiopia also does not have presidential elections, but has had 
founding parliamentary elections since 1994.
Founding Elections Subsequent Elections




Economic Policy Management in SSA: A Historical Perspective 
Economic policy following independence can be divided into three distinct phases: the first 
phase during 1960s and 1970s; the second phase during 1980s, and the third phase after the 
end of the end of the Cold War in 1989. 
The First Phase: Independence to End-1970s 
Foremost among the objectives of the SSA governments in the period immediately after 
independence, was to shift the basis of their economies away from the production of 
agricultural commodities, and toward the production of manufactured goods. Convinced that 
this strategy would leapfrog their economic development, governments in Africa intervened 
in agricultural markets to extract resources they needed to build a ―modern‖ economy.  
Collier et.al. (2008) stress that SSA countries at the dawn of independence were attracted by 
socialist and communist ideologies. As a result, many of them adopted strategies of 
development that relied on ownership of productive industries by the state, and an 
industrialization strategy focused on import substitution through high trade barriers, 
including an excessive taxation of exports. They note that there was a wide spectrum of the 
strength of state controls on the economy across SSA countries. On the one extreme, there 
were ―hard controls‖ regimes, such as those of Congo Brazzaville, or Tanzania during 1973-
85, where the banks and other main sectors of the economy were nationalized, and virtually 
all private economic activity was subject to strict regulation, including extensive price 
controls and investment licensing. On the other extreme, there were ―soft controls‖ regimes, 
such as Zambia 1963-91, where substantial parts of the economy, including banks, remained 
private and price controls were less pervasive.  
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As documented by Bates (1981), the policies adopted by SSA countries after independence 
included in particular:  
High taxes on the agricultural sector. Since the political base of governments was urban, 
agriculture was heavily taxed. The main tool to effect the needed transfer of resources away 
from agriculture and toward industry were state marketing boards, which were sanctioned 
monopsonies inherited from the colonial period for the purchase and export of agricultural 
goods. The original goal of marketing boards was to stabilize prices received by farmers in 
view of the large volatility of world market prices. However, the prices paid to farmers were 
almost always significantly below world market levels. Eventually, in most SSA countries 
these Boards were expected to have surpluses and lend them to the government, whose 
spending was concentrated in the urban areas and the manufacturing sector. 
Direct government involvement in agricultural production. These policies included 
subsidies for agricultural inputs and government-sponsored farming projects. Together with 
below-market agricultural prices, these policies ended up distorting incentives and benefited 
only a few privileged large farmers. 
Significantly overvalued exchange rates. This resulted in lower import prices, mainly for 
inputs to the manufacturing sector and consumptions goods for the urban areas, as other 
imports were discouraged by high imports tariffs (see below). The supply of foreign 
exchange was rationed through administrative quantitative controls, and channeled to those 
close to the regime, creating a political clientele. The manipulation of the exchange rate 
adversely affected upon the earnings of those producing cash crops for export.  
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High protective import tariffs for finished products. Initially, this policy was imposed 
mainly to conserve foreign exchange which, as discussed above, was underpriced and thus 
faced excessive demand. Over time, however, high tariffs became an instrument for 
economic protection, by sheltering domestic industries from competition. Effective 
protection was actually higher than suggested by nominal tariff rates, since inputs had 
significantly lower tariffs (and even exempted in many cases) compared to finished products. 
Financial repression to support industrialization. To encourage investment in the 
industrial sector, many SSA governments imposed low interest rates, either by constraining 
the lending practices of private banks or by creating state banks to offer low-cost loans to 
favored industrial sectors. The result was financial repression. 
Subsidies to the manufacturing sector. In many SSA countries the government invested 
directly in manufacturing plants. Often these firms operated at a loss, and survived only 
through continued government subsidies to cover their losses.   
The development strategy based on import substitution was not unique to Africa. Similar 
strategies had been adopted in many Latin American countries since the 1930s, and 
continued in various forms and degrees until the late 1980s. In addition, initially the growth 
model adopted by SSA governments seemed to be working. From independence until the 
early 1970s, for example, average growth in Africa was more rapid than in the first half of 
the century. During this period, while there were significant differences in economic 
performance across SSA, the average growth in SSA and its composition were 
indistinguishable from the geographically very different circumstances of south Asia (Collins 
and Bosworth, 1996). However, over time the results of the disastrous economic policies 
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discussed above started to take a toll across SSA, as benefits were conferred to an organized 
small group connected to the regime, and costs were spread over the masses of the 
unorganized. Contrary to the intended objective, rather than supporting development, these 
policies eventually undermined the agriculture sector, the most important sector in SSA’s 
economies. Faced with lower prices for their products and lack of financing, farmers 
produced less and less, leading to lower export earnings for SSA economies. This deprived 
the state from investing in industry.  
In addition, the selective subsidies for farmers’ inputs and overvalued exchange rates 
established powerful private lobbies that were more interested in rent-seeking behavior rather 
than engaging in productive economic activities. Furthermore, the high protection offered to 
domestic industries resulted in SSA industries being dominated by monopolies, which in 
many cases were owned by governments. Under such sheltered conditions, inefficient firms 
survived, and consumers ended up paying higher prices. For most SSA countries terms of 
trade also turned sharply negative during mid-1970s/early-1980s. With price pressures 
building up, temptation increased for governments to regulate even further, adversely 
affecting economic activity. 
As growth faltered and contributed to lower revenues, governments cut politically popular 
programs. The basis of equilibrium eroded, leading to economic and political crisis during 
the course of the 1970s (Bates, 1981). In Ghana, for example, per capita income in 1983 was 
below that at independence in 1957 (Easterly, 2001). This was the case in most other SSA 
countries as well. When the development strategy failed, military intervention reproduced in 
many SSA countries the colonial state legacy of autocracy in a different form (Young, 1994). 
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Botswana and Mauritious are the only two obvious exemptions to the above picture of 
economic mismanagement and counterproductive economic policies. At the dawn of 
independence, however, both countries did not look unusual in the African context. 
Mauritious, for example, continued to be heavily dependent on a single primary commodity 
export for many years after independence, and Botswana relied mainly on live animal exports 
for its foreign exchange earnings. Botswana is also predominantly tropical and landlocked, 
which many economists see as a disadvantage (see for example Bloom and Sachs, 1998). 
The difference between these two countries and the rest of SSA was good policies. Their 
basic system of law and contract worked reasonably well, and state predation was quite 
limited. Although there were government marketing boards in both countries which, as 
discussed above, was used by most African governments to extract resources from the rural 
sector, this was not the case in Botswana and Mauritius. Moreover both governments 
invested heavily in infrastructure, education and health. Fiscal policy has also been prudent 
in the extreme and the exchange rate remained closely tied to fundamentals. Finally, both 




The Second Phase: Late-1970s to Late-1980s 
As the economy faltered across the continent, almost all SSA countries were engaged in 
some kind of economic reform program with funding from the West during the 1980s. These 
programs attempted to implement stabilization and structural adjustment programs that 
sought, respectively, to return to macroeconomic equilibrium in the short term, and promote 
                                                 
1
 See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) for a discussion on economic policies in Botswana. 
20 
 
more rapid sustainable economic growth in the long term. The donors encouraged SSA states 
to undertake these reforms in exchange for substantial financial support. As discussed in de 
Walle (2001), between 1980 and 1989, for example, some 36 SSA countries contracted 241 
different loans from the IMF and the World Bank to finance stabilization and adjustment 
operations. 
However, there was a very slow rate of initial progress during this period, as the reforms 
supported by the IFIs programs were very rarely fully implemented, and also because 
progress in macroeconomic management remained vulnerable to reversals.  As discussed in 
Easterly (2001) economic distortions remained significant in Africa. This included very high 
black market exchange rate premiums, large budget deficits (net of aid), unprofitable state-
owned enterprises that continued to get large government subsidies, high inflation, and 
negative real interest rates. High black market premiums acted as taxes on exporters, high 
budget deficits were in most cases financed by money printing (in turn contributing to high 
inflation), low real interest rates caused financial repression (by discouraging financial 
savings in banks), trade protectionism (with the objective of supporting domestic 
industrialization through import substitution) caused inefficient allocation of resources, and 
excessive red tape and inadequate public services stifled private sector activity. 
In Uganda, for example, continued lax monetary and fiscal policies kept the inflation rate at 
over 50 percent as late as 1992. In Kenya also, the fiscal deficit was as high as 12 percent of 
GDP as recently as 1993. The main reason was that during this period the African state elites 
sought to adapt to changing circumstances without losing their hold on the state. The 
currency devaluation or trade liberalization required under the IFI-supported reforms as 
conditions for financing, while helping improve incentives for savings and production, also 
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deprived the powerful constituencies that had been the main beneficiaries of overvalued 
exchange rates, trade protection and ad-hoc subsidies under the old system.  
Progress in structural reforms also proceeded very slowly. While the 1980s witnessed the 
formal abolition of many of the public agencies that states had once created to monopolize 
food marketing and keep consumer prices down, in effect governments retained a central 
regulatory role, if not a monopoly, on the marketing of imported foods such as rice and 
wheat. Trade protection also remained very high. In the early 1990s, for example, SSA 
average tariff rates were about 25 percent, or about 4 times the non-OECD average, and 
foreign exchange premiums in the black market remained large in many SSA countries 
through the early 1990s.   
Some argue that the significant increase in aid during the 1980s, combined with ineffective 
policy conditionality, were a main reason for half-hearted reforms across Africa. Such critics 
stress that aid lessened the imperative to undertake reforms, and thus the incentives African 
governments had to implement policy reforms. In other words, aid scaling up effectively 
made policy reforms less likely, not more (de Walle, 2001, and Collier, 1997). 
Since growth performance deteriorated in most SSA countries during the 1980s, and the 
adjustment regime also produced a massive increase in external debt, the strong support for a 
powerful state to deal with market failures was fading, and it became increasingly clear that 
government failure was an equally pervasive and serious problem in Africa (Wade, 1990). 
Based on work in Africa and other regions, consensus started to form that basic 
macroeconomic stability was a prerequisite for growth (Rodrik, 1996). At the same time, 
while it was agreed that a low inflation environment was desirable, or that African 
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governments need to bring their fiscal deficits down, there was disagreement on the speed 
with which this was done and the mix of policies needed to achieve these objectives.  
The Third Phase: End of the Cold War (1989) Onward 
With the end of the Cold War, as discussed above, the focus and magnitude of financial 
support from bilateral and multilateral donors to Africa changed drastically. However, while 
affected by the global surge towards democracy at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, 
the democratic response in Africa reflected a cathartic reaction to an alienating state (Young, 
1994). Bratton and de Walle (1997) also argue that while international aid donors became 
major players in the game of regime transition after 1989, particularly when they began to 
wield the carrots and sticks of political conditionality, they only helped to create the 
conditions under which political change became possible, but did not in themselves trigger or 
sustain regime transitions or determine the directions the transitions took. Instead, they argue, 
the onset and subsequent trajectory of regime transition depended on the constellation of 
domestic political forces.  
The change in the development paradigm in Africa in the post Cold War period is clear. The 
amount of government spending to GDP in SSA, which had increased gradually from an 
average of about 15 percent of GDP in 1970 to nearly 30 percent in 1990, declined to just 
over 20 percent in the mid-1990s (Ndulu in Collier et. al., 2008). In addition, substantial 
progress was gradually made in implementing basic stabilization policies. In particular, 
exchange rate policies underwent the most dramatic improvements. While between 1975 and 
1984 eighteen of the regional economies in the CFA franc zone had 50 percent black market 
premium, by mid-1990s black market premiums have disappeared in nearly all countries 
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(except those with severe governance problems, such as Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, and 
Congo/Zaire). More generally, the liberalization of the exchange rate started in most SSA 
countries in mid-1980s and was complete by early 1990s in most cases. In addition, fiscal 
deficits fell from 10 percent in 1970s and 1980s to 4½ percent in 1997 and […] percent 
during the 2000s (see Chapter 2).  
However, particularly during the early years of democracy, progress in macroeconomic 
management was vulnerable to reversals, especially before elections to help ensure success 
of the incumbents. In Ghana, for example, the fiscal deficit increased from 5 percent of GDP 
in 1991 to nearly 13 percent in 1992, an election year in which Jerry Rawlings faced the 
voters for the first time. Over time, however, such a tendency for political budget cycles has 
declined markedly, and is no longer statistically significant (see Chapter 3).  
Summary 
Africa’s poor economic performance until early 1990s reflects, in part, its difficult 
geography, harsh climate, and high incidence of disease. The colonial state was also alien to 
African subjects, and left the continent at independence bereft of human capital, effective 
state, and physical infrastructure (particularly roads, ports and irrigation). The policies 
adopted by post-colonial governments were also disastrous. The costs of these failed policies 
eventually affected everyone, disrupting the political order.  This combination of adverse 
natural conditions, colonial legacy of a weak state that was alien to the Africans, and poor 
economic policies have held the continent back.  
The democratic response in the early 1990s reflected mainly a cathartic reaction to an 
alienating state, although it was also affected by developments in Eastern Europe. While 
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international aid donors became major players in the game of regime transition after 1989, 
particularly when they began to wield the carrots and sticks of political conditionality, they 
only helped create the conditions under which political change became possible, but did not 
in themselves trigger or sustain regime transitions or determine the direction that the 
transitions took.  
The move toward democracy in many SSA countries has been accompanied by significant 
policy reforms, particularly since the mid-1990s. These reforms include impressive gains in 
macroeconomic stability, and a gradual strengthening of institutions, resulting in significant 
growth acceleration in recent years. However, economic and political progress in SSA has 
had many false starts in the past, and reversals have been all too often. The next two chapters 
analyze (i) the main reasons behind the recent growth acceleration (Chapter 2), and (ii) the 





Chapter 2: What Explains the Recent Growth Acceleration in SSA? 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, with a few exceptions, the SSA economies experienced economic 
stagnation in the post-colonialist period up until the mid-1990s, reflecting a combination of 
adverse natural conditions, a colonial legacy of weak states that were alien to Africans, and 
misguided policies adopted by most postcolonial SSA governments. Because of low growth 
and rising income inequality since independence, at the turn of the millennium nearly half of 
the SSA population fell below the poverty line of US$1.5 per day (PPP adjusted), up from 35 
percent in 1970 (World Bank, 2006). 
In recent years, however, economic growth in SSA has accelerated rapidly. GDP growth in 
SSA averaged over 6 percent during 2001-07, more than double the growth average in the 
previous two decades, and its volatility also declined (Figure 1). In addition, while SSA’s 
growth performance seems to have broadly coincided with global economic cycles in recent 
decades, its GDP growth rate since early 2000s has been significantly higher than the world’s 
average, compared to well below world’s average during 1980-2000 (Figure 2). 
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Stylized Facts on Potential Factors behind SSA Growth Acceleration 
The main hypotheses that have been put forward to explain this significant growth 
acceleration in SSA in recent years, and its longer growth duration than has previously been 
the case, include (i) improved macroeconomic policies and strengthened institutions, (ii) 
better terms of trade, and (iii) higher external donor assistance. The main stylized facts on the 
potential impact of these three potential factors are discussed below.  
Macroeconomic policies and quality of institutions  
Indeed, the quality of policies and institutions in most SSA countries has shown dramatic 
improvements. Regarding policies, the growth acceleration has not come at the expense of 
macroeconomic stability as, excluding Zimbabwe, the average inflation in SSA declined to 
single digits from as high as 50 percent a year in the early-1990s (Figure 3). More 
importantly, countries that were more successful in reducing inflation, also enjoyed higher 
economic growth. As can be seen from Figure 4, the vast majority of countries that 
experienced a decline in inflation during 2001-07 relative to the 1990s, also had higher 
growth during the same period. 
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The quality of institutions in SSA has also improved significantly starting from the early 
1990s, with the number of democracies nearly quadrupling between 1990 and 2005, and the 
average democracy score improving significantly. However, half of SSA countries remain 
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Figure 5. Sub-Saharan Africa: Democracy Indicators, 1975-2009 1/
Number of democracies
Democracies as percent of total SSA states
Average democracy score
1/ Countries with polity2 indicator from the World Bank's CPI database with a value higher than 0 are classified 
as democracies. Polity2 takes values from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic).
 
Terms of trade 
Terms of trade do not seem to have had a significant impact on the recent SSA growth 
acceleration. As can be seen in Figure 6, there is no clear link between better terms of trade 
and higher growth among SSA 
countries. Of the 30 SSA countries 
that have had an increase in GDP 
growth during 2001-06 relative to 
1981-2000 (out of a total of 40 SSA 
countries included in Figure 6), 
more than half of them (24 
Figure 6. Change in GDP Growth and Terms of Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa
(2001-06 versus 1980-2000)
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countries) have actually had a deterioration in terms of trade between the two periods. The 
apparent lack of a clear link between better terms of trade and the recent growth acceleration 
in SSA seems to defy the conventional wisdom that Africa’s recent success may have been 
largely due to higher commodity prices, and consistent with findings of cross-country 
regressions that terms of trade improvements play a notoriously modest role in explaining 
differences in growth performance (World Bank, 2008). While the SSA oil producers have 
clearly been beneficiaries (especially Angola, Gabon, and Nigeria), the majority of SSA 
countries have had a deterioration in their terms of trade in recent years.  
Foreign aid 
A number of economists and political scientists have noted that the end of Cold War marked 
a watershed for external assistance to Africa, as simply professing ideological preferences 
was no longer enough to earn financial support from the two superpowers. Some argue that 
external assistance after the end of the Cold War was better targeted to governments that 
undertook democratic and economic reforms. However, while continuing to help good 
performers, this change in aid policy undermined the legitimacy of many autocrats. As a 
result, a number of governments propped up by the superpowers collapsed, and their 
countries succumbed to violence (e.g., Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, and Zaire).  
Available data from OECD show that total external financial assistance to SSA has increased 
sharply in recent years following a significant decline in the second half of the 1990s. At 
unchanged US$ prices, aid to SSA increased by about 25 percent during 2001-06 relative to 
1991-2000, and in 2006 it was nearly double the average of 1991-2000 (Figure 7). It is worth 
noting, however, that only in 2005-06 did aid in fixed US$ prices exceed the previous peak 
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of the early 1990s. In addition, while Figure 8 suggests there is a positive correlation between 
increases in aid as a share of GDP and higher GDP growth rates, aid as a share to GDP 
during 2001-06 was higher than that during 1991-2000 in only 8 out of the 43 SSA countries 
included in Figure 8. In addition, out of 35 SSA countries that had lower aid in 2001-06 
relative to 1991-2000, more than half (20 countries) had higher growth in the former period 
relative to the latter. It thus does not seem that aid has been a major driver of the recent 
growth acceleration in SSA. 
Figure 7. Net Official Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-2006
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Figure 8. Changes in Aid and GDP Growth during 2001-06 versus 1991-2000
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Summarizing, the stylized facts discussed above seem to support the view that the 
acceleration of growth in SSA that started in late-1990s has been associated with 
improvement in economic policies and institutions. Most SSA countries pursued sound 
macroeconomic policies, built their institutions and advanced economic reforms, and took 
advantage of economic opportunities from a favorable global environment. While aid seems 
to have a positive correlation with growth, overall aid to SSA at constant prices has exceeded 
the previous peak levels of early 1990s only in 2005-06, and aid as a share of GDP increased 
during the 2000s relative to the average of the 1990s in only a small fraction of SSA 
countries. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, growth acceleration in SSA does not 
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seem to have been fueled by better terms of trade. Given the limitations on what can be 
inferred from bilateral correlations between growth acceleration and potential explanatory 
factors, the rest of the chapter analyzes the recent growth acceleration in SSA in a more 
systematic manner.  
Main Questions and Proposed Methodology 
Against this background, this chapter seeks to address the following main questions related to 
the recent growth acceleration in SSA: 
 Is the growth acceleration mainly due to factor accumulation or higher TFP? 
 What is the role of policies as opposed to institutions on the growth acceleration? 
 Is aid an important determinant of the growth acceleration?  
 To what extent is the growth acceleration driven by favorable terms of trade? 
To examine these questions this chapter uses the three main approaches used in the growth 
literature: (i) growth accounting; (ii) standard panel growth regressions; and (iii) probit 
analysis focused on growth accelerations episodes. Before outlining the strategy and 
specifications of these approaches, it is worth discussing the criticism on growth accounting 
and growth regressions, and the defense offered by their proponents.  
Criticism of traditional growth approaches 
The criticism on growth accounting has been concentrated in three areas.  
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First, total productivity is measured as a residual, and given that there are a myriad of 
determinants behind the residual, it should not be taken as an indicator of technical change.  
Second, the decomposition is sensitive to the nature of production process and the income 
shares assumed for the factors of production. Data limitations force economists to use a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, and thus to assume fixed income shares for capital and 
labor across countries. The use of the Cobb-Douglas production function has also an 
additional implication—that TFP differences are factor neutral (i.e., we cannot tell whether 
an increase in TFP is due to a more efficient use of physical capital versus that of human 
capital).  
Third, an accounting decomposition cannot determine fundamental causes of growth, i.e., for 
a country that is experiencing rapid increases in both capital accumulation and factor 
productivity, it is not clear whether the productivity growth caused the capital accumulation, 
or whether the capital accumulation made additional innovations possible. Critics stress that 
concerns on the endogeneity of both factor inputs suggests caution against using growth 
accounts to infer a casual interpretation of the growth process.  
Usefulness of standard panel growth regressions has come under fire for three main reasons.  
First, endogeneity of policy and institutional variables. Some critics (e.g., Rodrik, 2005) 
argue that it is difficult to find instruments for policy variables that satisfy both the 
exogeneity and exclusion requirements, and that plausible instruments for such variables are 
very few.  
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Second, instability of parameter estimates and model linearity. These concerns arise out of 
the extreme heterogeneity of the sampled population of the economies, as well as 
unreliability of data in many developing countries included in panel studies. For example, 
while microeconomic evidence suggests that the private returns to education are substantial 
and growth theory routinely imputes a social return to human capital investment that is as 
great as the private return, growth researchers have had an extraordinarily difficult time 
finding statistically and economically plausible impacts of educational variables in global 
growth regressions (Pritchett, 2002). More generally, the concern about parameter instability 
is that standard panel growth regressions are based on very strong assumptions about a single 
linear model being appropriate for all countries at all states. As discussed by Hausmann et. al. 
(2005), for instance, in models with ―poverty traps‖ the relationship between policy variables 
and of growth outcomes is not linear, as a movement across a threshold can cause a switch 
from a ―trap‖ state to a growth state.  
Third, lack of appropriate focus on growth acceleration episodes and ignoring expectations. 
Some critics have argued that the traditional focus of empirical growth research on long-
horizon in panel data growth regressions can camouflage important medium-term patterns in 
a country’s growth. Some also view the role of expectations as being very important, as the 
same policy intervention may have extremely different impact on resource allocations, 
depending on whether it is expected to be sustained over time or quickly reversed. 
In defense of traditional growth approaches 
Defenders of growth accounting recognize that despite its extensive use, this method has 
done surprisingly little to resolve some of the most fundamental issues under debate in 
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development literature. There is no consensus, for example, on growth determinants—such 
as on the contribution of capital accumulation versus improvements in total factor 
productivity, the role of increased education, or the importance of economic policy. 
Defenders of traditional panel growth regressions also recognize that no effective instruments 
have been found for policy variables used in this approach.  
At the same time, the defenders argue that if properly implemented and interpreted, both 
growth accounts and growth regressions are valuable tools, and have improved our 
understanding of growth experiences across countries, e.g., Bosworth and Collins (2003) and 
Frankel (2003). They note that the two approaches are useful, because used in concert they 
enable researchers to explore the channels (factor accumulation versus factor productivity) 
through which various determinants influence growth. Caselli (2004) also argues that while 
growth accounting cannot explain the ultimate reasons why a country grows faster or slower 
than another, it is a useful diagnostic tool. He stresses that, similar to a medical test, growth 
accounting can identify whether a country suffers from a certain ailment (e.g., low factor 
accumulation or low efficiency) and, although it cannot reveal the causes of such ailment, it 
is nonetheless a useful test to perform. Defenders of cross-country regressions also note that 
valid instruments have been found for institutional quality variables. In addition, Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004) argue that using initial conditions or lagged values of regressors, which 
can be considered predetermined for an individual country, minimizes the endogeneity 
concern in growth regressions. However, given that policy variables are endogenous, a 
number of economists (e.g., Bosworth and Collins, 2003) also stress that the OLS results of 
panel growth regressions should be interpreted descriptively and, like growth accounts, one 
should be careful when using these regressions to infer the underlying causes of growth.  
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More recently, to address concerns about the strong linear assumption of panel growth 
regression, which may miss turning points in economic growth, some studies begin by 
identifying growth acceleration episodes, and then examining their potential determinants 
(see, for example, Hausmann et. al., 2005). For this reason, this chapter includes an analysis 
focusing on growth accelerations, to complement traditional growth accounting and panel 
growth regression. 
Methodological issues and main findings in literature 
Growth accounting 
The main challenges using the growth accounting approach are: (i) the accurate measurement 
of income and factors of production (capital and labor), and (ii) choosing a functional form 
for the income process. On the first issue, quality differences in the capital stock make it 
difficult measuring capital input by relying exclusively on quantity. As for the functional 
form of the income process, the standard framework relies on a Cobb-Douglas specification 
of the production function, in which efficiency differences are factor neutral—i.e., if a 
country uses physical capital efficiently, it also necessarily uses human capital efficiently 
(Caselli, 2004).  
The main approaches used in the growth literature to estimate factor shares in output consist 
of (i) estimating directly the coefficients of the production function by regressing the rate of 
growth of output on the growth rates of capital and labor, with the intercept measuring the 
growth in TFP, and the coefficients on the factor growth rates measuring, respectively, the 
shares of capital and labor; and (ii) adopting a calibration approach, i.e., using a priori 
measures for capital and labor shares—in the range of 0.3-0.4 for capital and 0.6-0.7 for 
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labor (e.g., Bosworth and Collins, 2004).
2
 The disadvantage of the regression approach is that 
the growth of capital and labor cannot usually be regarded as exogenous with respect to that 
of TFP (Barro, 1999). Further, as argued by Aiyer and Dalgaard (2005), the standard Cobb-
Douglas methodology of assuming a constant capital share of about one-third for all 
countries is a very good approximation to a more general formulation under which countries 
have different aggregate production functions that do not require a constant elasticity of 
substitution among factors. 




)1()(   HLAKY                                           (1) 
where: Y is the gross domestic product (GDP), K is the physical capital stock, A is the level 
of technology (and corresponds to the standard notion of total factor productivity (TFP)), L is 
labor inputs, which is assumed to be augmented by H, an index of the average level of labor 
quality.
4
 This Cobb-Douglas production function assumes constant returns to scale. Equation 
(1) can be transformed to yield the growth in output per worker (y/l) as follows: 
   ahlkly  )1()/(/      (2) 
                                                 
2
 See Iradian (2009) for a summary of approaches used in the literature.  
3
 For a detailed description of the methodology see Collins (2004). 
4
 An alternative formulation would have human capital (education) as an independent factor in the growth 
process that can augment labor, physical capital, and TFP—not just labor—as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992), and Klenow and Rodrigruez-Claire (1997).  
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where lower case letters denote a variable’s average annual growth rate. The capital stock 
measure is constructed from investment data using the perpetual inventory method as below: 
   1)1(  ttt KIK       (3) 
where is depreciation rate that is usually assumed to be 0.05.  
The approach used in this chapter excludes the impact of human capital (H), given that the 
human capital (H) is particularly difficult to measure given lack of education data for most 
SSA countries. Barro and Lee (2000) and Cohen and Soto (2001) have constructed data sets 
for human capital for large samples of countries through 2000, including many SSA counties, 
but no updates are made since then. This is not likely to particularly problematic for a 
number of reasons:  
First, the return to one additional year of schooling is relatively low—at between 10-20 
percent (see Caselli, 2004). Since higher human capital in SSA proxied by additional years of 
schooling, it is likely to have only a limited impact on the SSA growth acceleration.  
Second, using the years of schooling as a measure of educational attainment, does not 
incorporate any adjustment for quality variations. This creates problems when examining the 
impact of education on income across countries. Easterly (2001), for example, argues that 
despite the rapid growth in human capital over the 1960 to 1987 period in many African 
countries —including Angola, Mozambique, Ghana, Zambia, Madagascar, Sudan and 
Senegal—their economic growth has nevertheless been a disaster. Pritchett (1999) also 
shows that while educational capital growth in SSA was much higher than that of East Asia 
during 1960-85 (over 4 percent per year and less than 3 percent per year, respectively), the 
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GDP per capita growth in SSA was much lower than that of East Asia during the same period 
(about 0.5 percent per year and over 4 percent per year, respectively).  
Third, the quality of education data is rather noisy. De la Fuente and Domenech (2002), for 
example, conclude that the average years of education in the Barro and Lee data set are rather 
noisy, and argue that poor data quality explains in part why human-capital based models 
often perform rather poorly. 
For these reasons, while conceptually education seems quite an important ingredient for 
economic growth over the long term, for relatively short horizons the link between growth 
and education may be tenuous. Thus not much will be lost when making growth 
decomposition excluding the H variable from the equation (1) above.  
The investment series used in this chapter is based on overall investments (i.e., public plus 
private investments) reported in national accounts. Given the perceived weaknesses in the 
classification of public investment spending in SSA, an unsuccessful effort was made to 
compile an alternative series on investment for each country based on imported equipments. 
The latter could be a good proxy of investment spending based on findings by Eaton and 
Kortum (2001), given that for most of the world’s capital is produced in a small number of 
R&D-intensive countries, with the rest of the world generally importing their equipment. 
However, data series on equipment imports were either too short, or simply not available for 
most SSA countries.  
Using the approach outlined in (1)-(3) above, World Bank (2008), which studies SSA growth 
experience during 1960-2000, finds that the growth shortfall in the continent through mid-
1990s is due to a steady decline in physical capital accumulation per worker, both in absolute 
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term and relative to other developing countries, and that the recovery experienced during the 
second half of the 1990s, by contrast, is entirely accounted for by rapid increases in the 
productivity residual. In addition, they find that the empirical link between physical capital 
accumulation and growth is weaker in SSA than it was in other developing regions between 
1960 and 2000, which is a phenomenon widely observed in the growth literature. The 
dominant interpretations of this include inefficient public sector investment (Artadi and Sala-
i-Martin, 2003), diversion of resources into rent-seeking and corruption (Vishny and Shleifer, 
1993), and threshold effects (Sachs et. al., 2004). 
Empirical Approaches 
Early empirical work on economic growth focused mainly on cross-section econometrics, 
regressing growth over a relatively long period of time (2-4 decades) against policies and a 
number of control variables capturing specific country characteristics. More recently, work 
has focused on two main tracks—(i) panel growth regressions, which organize data in 4-5 
year averages, and (ii) empirical approaches that examine the role policies and institutions on 
episodes of significant acceleration in economic growth. Both approaches are used in this 
chapter, as discussed below. 
Panel growth regressions 
As noted in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), economic theories are not precise enough to 
pinpoint the exact determinants of growth. Therefore the standard empirical framework that 
seeks to find such determinants uses two kinds of variables in panel regressions: first, initial 
levels of state variables, such as the stock of physical capital and the stock of human capital; 
and second, control variables, such the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the ratio of 
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domestic investment to GDP, the extent of international openness, movements in the terms of 
trade, the fertility rate, indicators of macroeconomic stability, measurements of maintenance 
of the rule of law and democracy, and so on. 
A paper by Sala-i-Martin et. al. (2000) identifies a number of variables that are strongly or 
robustly related to growth: human capital, initial level of per capita GDP (as a measure of 
conditional convergence), life expectancy, dummy of being a tropical country, and 
government consumption in GDP. Variables not robustly related to growth included, 
surprisingly, the number of revolutions and coups, as well as the index of political rights, 
inflation rate, spending in public education, and measures of higher education.  
Bosworth and Collins (2004) use the following variables in growth regressions: (i) for initial 
conditions and external shocks: the initial income per capita, life expectancy, log of 
population, Frankel-Romer-Rose trade instrument, geography, and institutional quality; and 
(ii) for policy variables: the budget balance, inflation, and Sachs-Warner openness variable.   
As shown in World Bank (2008), which summarizes panel growth regression models used in 
the literature, equation (1) can be transformed into: 
  itiititit zxyy   ''lnln     (4) 
Where it is country/period disturbance, 0  is the speed of convergence along the steady-
state path, and vectors itx and iz are, respectively, time-varying and time-invariant 
determinants of the growth in per capita income. In literature these determinants include a 
number of theoretical variables that affect factor accumulation of productivity, such as policy 
variables, institutional quality, political indicators, and geographical location. In global 
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growth regressions, the initial health and education attainment are often strong predictors of 
subsequent growth. It has to be noted that institutional variables, similar to those on 
geography, tend to change only slowly over time, and their role in growth regressions has 
traditionally been limited to explaining cross-sectional rather than intertemporal variations in 
growth (World Bank, 2008). 
Empirical approaches focused on growth accelerations 
This section describes the approach used below for identifying growth accelerations and the 
empirical methodology. For an episode to be considered ―growth acceleration‖, the following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
1) 5.1, nttg  percent per year 
2) 2,   ntntg  percent 
3)   ],[,max tntiyy int   
Where nttg ,  is the growth rate during a certain period (following baseline specification in 
Hausmann et. al. (2005), n=6, i.e., the time horizon is seven years), ntntg  ,  is the change in 
the average growth rate during the acceleration episode compared to the average growth for 
the previous period of the same length, and nty   is real output per capita during the time 
window chosen.  
This proposed filter aims to identify ―real‖ growth acceleration episodes, by combining a 
relatively high level of per capita growth with a significant acceleration of growth. The first 
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condition is to ensure that growth is high during the acceleration period, the second condition 
defines the threshold increase in the growth rate for it to be considered growth acceleration, 
and the third condition to ensure that an acceleration in growth is not due to a mere recovery 
from a previous decline. Setting growth at 1.5 percent as a floor for high growth may seem 
like a low bar for an episode to be considered among growth accelerations, but was selected 
to include cases in which the overall growth in a number of strong accelerations signaled a 
clear change in the subsequent growth path relative to the pre-acceleration period, such as 
Benin in 1995, Cameroon in 1996, Republic of Congo in 2000, Ghana in 2000, Senegal in 
1995, Swaziland in 2003, and Uganda in 1988 (see Table 2). For robustness, tests with 
minimum growth thresholds of 5.2, nttg  and 5.3, nttg  were also conducted, in line with 
the threshold used in Hausmann et. al. (2005). 
The empirical strategy is to use a probit analysis, with the dependent variable being a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 around growth accelerations and 0 otherwise, and the 
explanatory variables including a number of variables of interest—such as those on external 
shocks, political changes, and economic reforms. More specifically, the dummy variable on 
the growth acceleration takes the value 1 in time t-1, t, and t+1, where t is the year of 
acceleration identified by the filter described above.  
The explanatory variables are defined as follows: 
Terms of trade (TOT): is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the average change 
in the terms of trade in period t versus that of the previous four years (t-4) is in the upper 10 
percent of the whole sample, and 0 otherwise. Such a variable is meant to capture 
exceptionally favorable terms of trade. 
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Political regime change (Higher_Dem): is a dummy variable that take the value 1 in the 
five-year period starting from the year in which the change in the polity2 score of the Polity 
IV database increases by at least three units. 
End of wars (War_End): is a dummy variable that take the value 1 in the five-year period 
starting from the year in which a war ends, according to the Armed Conflicts Database.
5
 
Economic liberalization (Econ_Lib): takes the value 1 for the first five years starting from 
the year in which the index originally developed by Sachs and Warner (1995), and later 
extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), is considered as ―open‖, and 0 otherwise. As 
discussed in Hausmann et. al. (2005), this index is a good candidate for a measure that 
captures broad economic reforms.  
Aid increase (Aid): takes the value 1 for the three-year period starting from the year in 
which the three-year average exceeds that of the previous three-year average by at least 3 
percentage points of GDP. While arbitrary, the threshold of 3 percentage points of GDP on 
the increase of aid is about 1/3 of median aid to SSA countries during the period 1980-2006.  
Issues of Robustness 
Panel Growth Regressions 
One estimation problem is which explanatory variables to include in the growth equations. 
Variables could be statistically significant depending on whether certain other variables are 
or not included in the specifications. Growth theory does not provide a clear guide on which 
                                                 
5 See link at http://www.prio.no/pd/GenericPage.aspx?id=726. 
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indicators to include in the growth regressions. For this, a number of specifications were 
estimated using a combination of the traditional growth explanatory variables. 
Another concern is the possible sensitivity of the result to the assumed form of the growth 
process. In equation (4) the explanatory variables enter linearly and independently. This 
reflects an ad-hoc assumption that the marginal effect of a change in every explanatory 
variable is constant, both across different levels of the variable and across different 
economies. This concern was addressed by testing for nonlinearities, which was done by 
introducing squared terms for particular variables, and also interacting some of the variables 
of interest with a measure of country’s level of development (such as per capital income) in 
the growth regressions as done in Iradian (2008). 
Additional robustness checks included running different subsamples of SSA countries, such 
as including and excluding resource-rich countries, and including and excluding small 
islands. 
Probit Analysis on Growth Accelerations 
As for the approach focusing on growth accelerations, the parameters of the filter are 
somewhat arbitrary. It should also be noted that qualitatively the parameters of the filter 
described above are standard, but in most similar studies the first threshold is set for an 
annual growth rate higher than 3-3.5 percent. The 1.4 percent threshold proposed for this 
paper represents the medium growth rate in SSA during 1980-2007. The implications of 
changing filter parameters will be discussed below. 
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Role of Aid 
Foreign aid to most SSA countries is several points of GDP per year, and represents a 
significant share in the SSA budgets. It is thus important to examine in some detail whether 
aid has played any role in the recent SSA growth acceleration. The effectiveness of foreign 
aid in promoting economic growth in developing countries remains a contentious are of 
debate both theoretically and empirically. This section summarizes the differing theoretical 
arguments, as well as conflicting empirical findings in a number of recent studies on aid 
effectiveness. 
Theoretically, in a simple neoclassical growth model (e.g., Solow model) aid increases 
economic growth through its positive impact on investments in the aid-recipient country, as 
long as the recipient’s GDP is below the level corresponding to its peak transitional growth 
rate. The neoclassical model suggests that poor countries should have a high return to capital 
and a fast growth rate in transition to the steady state. However, there are several factors that 
could interfere with this process. With a subsistence consumption constraint and imperfect 
international capital markets, poor countries will tend to grow slowly despite a high marginal 
return to investment. In this context foreign aid can accelerate growth rates in the transition 
to a steady state. Furthermore, various institutional and policy distortions can lower the 
return to capital and reduce transitional growth rates. Burnside and Dollar (2000) show that 
in such a model, the impact of aid will be greater in a low-distortion environment. In general, 
developing country growth rates depend on initial income, institutional and policy 
distortions, aid, and aid interacted with distortions.  
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However, in reality foreign aid is intermediated by governments, and these are not always 
best thought of as benevolent social planners. The incentives faced by political figures are 
not necessarily the same as those faced by a social planner. Given this, it is possible that aid 
can have little or no impact on overall economic prosperity in the recipient country. Mosley 
and Hudson (1996) and Svensson (1996a, 1996b), for example have shown that when the 
donor-recipient relationship is modeled as a non-cooperative game, moral hazard problems 
can lead to aid having little impact on the problems it is intended to alleviate. Aid may 
simply relax the budget constraint of the recipient government, without having much impact 
on the amount of that budget that ultimately is used to purchase capital. Furthermore, the 
donor government can also be part of this game for reasons other than benevolence. Donor 
interest may lead to the suboptimal use of aid and dampen any positive impact that it may 
otherwise have. 
In models with poverty traps, even a temporary injection of aid may help a country take off, 
and reach a permanently higher level of per capita income. However, in game-theoretic 
models, moral hazard and adverse selection problems reduce aid effectiveness predicted by 
the simple Solow model. Aid critics also point out that, to a significant extent, aid 
effectiveness is affected by the political regime, including the quality of institutions and 
government policies. They also stress that aid is fungible, and additional aid may actually end 
up financing an increase in consumption rather than investment.  
Empirically too, there is no consensus on the effectiveness of aid on growth. By now, there is 
a long and inconclusive literature on aid effectiveness, which is hampered by data 
availability, debates over the mechanisms through which aid affects growth, and 
disagreements over econometric specifications. On the one hand, for example, Boone (1996) 
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finds that aid increases consumption, but does not in most cases have a significant positive 
impact on higher investments, or leads to an improvement in basic human development 
indicators. Boone argues that his findings support the pessimistic predictions of Bauer (1971) 
and Friedman (1958) that aid flows basically benefit political elites, and do not substantially 
change government incentives to carry out the programs intended to be supported by the aid 
flows. On the other hand, Hansen and Tarp (2000) provide overwhelming support that aid 
raises the level of investment in recipient countries, and that in turn higher investments have 
a positive effect on growth. They also find that the aid-growth relationship depends not only 
on the level of aid, but also on key policy indicators. In another influential study, Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) find that aid has a positive effect on growth in the presence of good 
policies and institutions, but little effect otherwise. More recently, Clemens et. al. (2004) find 
that while there is no discernible relationship between growth and overall aid, when aid flows 
are divided into aid that has short-term and long-term impact, the former has a strong and 
statistically significant causal relationship on economic growth.  
Findings that support a positive impact of aid on economic growth in some of the above 
studies have been challenged by subsequent papers that have used updated data sets, or 
different model specifications. Easterly et. al. (2004), for example, find that aid effectiveness 
results in Burnside and Dollar (2000) are not robust to a data set with longer time series and 
that includes additional countries. While Easterly et. al., do not argue that aid is ineffective, 
they suggest that ―...economists and policymakers should be less sanguine about concluding 
that foreign aid will boost growth in countries with good policies.‖ Rajan and Subramanian 
(2005) also find little evidence of a robust positive impact of aid on growth. While they find 
some evidence of a positive relationship between aid and growth for the period 1980-2000, 
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this is not the case when outliers are excluded. In addition, they find no evidence that aid 
works better in stronger policy environments, as suggested by Burnside and Dollar (2000), or 
that certain kinds of aid work better than others as suggested by Clemens et. al. (2004). 
Against this background, this chapter tests the aid effectiveness bearing in mind its 
endogeneity with economic growth, and thus that a positive correlation between aid and 
growth does not necessarily imply causality from aid to growth. Given the large size of aid to 
GDP in most SSA countries, the chapter also examines whether aid has been better targeted 
to governments that have undertaken democratic and economic reforms and have sought to 
build better institutions. 
Results  
Growth Accounting 
Before discussing the results of growth accounting, it is worth stressing that this approach is 
probably better suited to analyze growth performance over long periods of time, given the 
significant volatility at high frequencies in both labor and capital accumulation (and, as a 
result, in the TFP residual as well). The usefulness of this approach therefore in analyzing 
growth accelerations is somewhat limited.  
Turning to the results, as can be seen in Table 1 and Figure 9, most SSA countries 
experienced a significant increase in growth during 2001-07 compared to the previous two 
decades, which reflected a combination of higher capital per worker as well as higher TFP. In 
about 80 percent of SSA countries in Figure 9 (33 out of 42), for example, output per worker 
during 2001-07 was higher relative to the 1990s. Of the 33 SSA countries that experienced 
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higher growth, 23 of them (about 70 percent) also enjoyed higher TFP growth, and in 15 of 
them (about 50 percent) the increase in TFP growth exceeded that in capital per worker. The 
improvement in overall growth and TFP was particularly large in countries that started 
enjoying peace in the mid-1990s/early-2000s after years of disruptive wars and other civil 
conflicts, and thus the turnaround reflects negative growth in earlier periods (e.g., Angola, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone). 
A number of oil exporters (notably Angola and Nigeria) also enjoyed a significant increase in 
the TFP.  
Not only was SSA growth higher during 2001-07 relative to the previous two decades, but 
the number of SSA countries with negative growth declined from 25 countries in 1991-2000 
(more than half of SSA countries) to just 11 countries in 2001-07 (about a quarter of SSA 
countries). In the latter group, negative capital contribution was the main reason, with 
negative TFP accounting for only about a third of these countries (4 out of 11 countries). The 
majority of countries with negative output per worker during the 2001-07 were experiencing 
some sort of internal conflict (e.g., Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, 
Guinea-Bissau, and Zimbabwe).  
While both the capital per worker and TFP exhibit a wide range of variation across all 
periods, the magnitude of variation has declined during 2001-07 for both indicators relative 
to 1991-2000, and the variance of TFP has remained well below that of capital per worker.
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Figure 9. Contribution of Physical Capital and TFP in SSA Growth Differences




























































































































































































































































































































Standard Panel Regressions 
The data used for panel regressions are four-year averages for the period 1970-2006 (a total 
of nine four-year periods). The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate per 
capita during each four-year period, and the explanatory variables are as follows:   
Initial conditions and external shocks variables  
Init_Inc—initial income per capita; and 
Init_Life_Exp—initial life expectancy;  
Policy variables  
Gov_Bal—the budget balance as a share of GDP; 
M2_GDP—ratio of M2 to GDP;  
Infl_Avg—the inflation rate; and  
Open_Trade—the trade openness variable originally developed by Sachs and Warner, and 
later updated by Wacziarg and Welsh.  
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Institutional variables  
CPIA—the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment index, which rates 
countries against a set of 16 criteria on the quality of policies and institutions;
6
 and  
ICRGE—the economic risk indicator from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
group—as an alternative measure of governance and institutional quality.  
Other variables 
War—dummy variable that takes the value 1 in a particular four-year period if the country 
had been a war in any year of that four-year period and 0 otherwise, with information on 
wars taken from the armed conflict dataset.
7
 
ODA_Aid—the aid to GDP ratio provided by official donors, as reported by OECD under the 
official developments assistance (ODA) statistics. 
Country and time fixed effects were used to control, respectively, for specific country 
characteristics (that would otherwise lead to missing variables problem, such as landlocked 
vs countries with sea access, British vs French colonies, incidence of disease, etc), and for 
global effects (such as international business cycles).  
The results are summarized in Table 2. The first two columns are fixed effects OLS 
specifications—the first for the whole period and the second for post-Cold War period. The 
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 For more details see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict. 
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sign of variables is generally as expected, although for the whole period only the initial 
income is statistically significant. In the post-Cold War period, however, open trade and aid 
variables become statistically significant also, the former at the 1 percent level and the latter 
at the 10 percent level. The inflation variable also becomes statistically significant, but has 
the wrong sign although with a very small coefficient. As noted above, the OLS 
specifications suffer from endogeneity problems for the policy, institutional, and aid 
variables. Therefore a positive correlation of these variables with growth should not be 
considered to infer causality. It is worth noting, however, that a positive correlation for aid 
seems to rebut the claim that higher aid is detrimental to growth. The magnitude of the aid 
coefficient for the post-Cold War period also seems consistent with that suggested by growth 
theory (see Rajan and Subramanian, 2005).  
To address endogeneity of aid, the third and fourth columns are fixed effects two-stage least 
squares, instrumenting for aid using the approach in Clemens et. al. (2004).  The results are 
broadly unchanged from the OLS results, except that the magnitude of the aid variable is 
larger and statistically significant for both the whole and the post-Cold War periods, and the 
war variable also becomes statistically significant. It is also worth noting that the first stage 
results for aid suggest that it is positively correlated with better political and institutional 
indicators (CPIA and ICRGE scores), and a more open trade regime.  
The last two columns represent the results from a system GMM approach. While the 
magnitude of the variables remains broadly similar to the OLS and 2SLS, only the 
government balance and inflation variables remain statistically significant.  
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Summarizing, as expected, initial income is negatively correlated with growth, trade 
openness is positively correlated, and armed conflicts are negatively correlated. Political and 
institutional indicators also seem to be positively correlated, but usually not statistically 
significant, which may be because the positive effects of good policies and institutions take a 
long time to show up in growth, and their effect cannot be adequately captured in standard 
growth regressions. The results also suggest that the magnitude of aid’s correlation with 
growth seems to have increased in the post-Cold War period, which is consistent with the 
view that the end of the Cold War has been a watershed in the way donors provided aid to 
SSA.  
Growth accelerations 
Using the filter described above with a growth threshold of 1.5 percent yields 37 growth 
accelerations in SSA during the period 1980-2007 (34 if small islands are excluded) (Table 
3).
 
 If instead the threshold for the growth rate in the post-acceleration period were set at 2.5 
and 3.5 percent the number of growth accelerations in SSA during 1980-2007 would fall 
from 37 to, respectively, 28 and 22 episodes, with a clear upward trend of growth 
accelerations in SSA since 2000. In addition, the magnitude of the typical growth 
acceleration in SSA has been relatively high, with the  average growth acceleration during 
1980-2007 amounting at about 5.9 percentage points. Only 4 accelerations are associated 
with the oil boom of recent years (Angola in 2002, Chad in 2001, Republic of Congo in 
2000, and Nigeria in 2000). 
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Before embarking into the probit analysis, it is useful to examine the bivariate relationship 
between growth accelerations in SSA and their potential determinants. Following the 
approach in Hausmann et. al. (2005), Table 4 reports two statistics.  
First, the proportion of growth accelerations preceded or accompanied by changes in the four 
potential determinants discussed above—i.e., terms of trade shocks, end of wars, trade 
liberalization reforms, and political regime changes. 
(ii) Second, the proportion of changes in these four determinants that are followed or 
accompanied by growth accelerations.  
The first statistic is indicative of the explanatory power of these four potential determinants 
on growth accelerations, whereas the second statistic is suggestive of the success rate that 
these potential determinants have in generating growth accelerations. For both statistics a 
match is considered when a five-year period following the event of a potential growth 
determinant overlaps with a three-year window centering on the growth accelerations events 
listed in Table 2. The five-year window for potential growth determinants is to allow them to 
have an effect on growth, and the three-year window on growth accelerations is to reduce the 
probability of a ―near miss‖ given the arbitrariness in the parameters of the filter used to 
identify growth accelerations.  
The bottom line of Table 4 results is that the relationship between growth accelerations and 
the five potential determinants considered is positive, but that the strength of such 
relationships is relatively moderate. More specifically, the results suggest that the 
explanatory power is: relatively strong for aid (46 percent), moderate for both trade 
liberalization and positive change in democracy (36 and 32 percent, respectively), relatively 
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low for end of wars (21 percent), and very weak for improvements in terms of trade and for 
negative changes in democracy (11 and 14 percent, respectively). The success rate of these 
five  determinants in generating growth accelerations is somewhat higher than their 
explanatory power for three variables—trade liberalization, end of wars and positive changes 
in democracy (about 40 percent for each of them), but lower for aid (30 percent) and very 
weak for improvements in terms of trade (only 4 percent). The success rate of a negative 
change in democracy is also surprisingly high (nearly 40 percent), although it is useful to 
note that during 1980-2007 episodes of negative changes in democracy in SSA were 
significantly lower than those involving positive changes (32 vs. 18). Also, it is worth noting 
that while the increase in aid has the strongest explanatory power among the variables 
considered in Table 3, its success rate is actually lower than for the other variables. 
A probit analysis was also conducted to see in a more systematic way the role of policies and 
institutions in growth accelerations in SSA. The dependent variable as discussed above is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 in the three years centered around the year in which the 
algorithm described above suggests a growth acceleration (i.e., the dummy takes the value in 
the period [t-1, t+1], where ―t‖ is the year identified as growth acceleration). The explanatory 
variables are also dummy variables defined as discussed above. 
The results are summarized in Table 5.
8
 The baseline specification (1) includes all the 
explanatory variables—i.e., ends of wars, higher democracy, trade liberalization, better terms 
of trade, and higher aid. The first two variables are statistically significant, whereas the other 
three are not. Since the series for trade liberalization is missing for countries accounting for 
                                                 
8
 The sample excludes the small island SSA countries given that for them a number of the explanatory variables 
are not available. 
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more than half of the growth acceleration episodes, specification (2) drops the trade 
liberalization variable, whereas (3) drops terms of trade and aid variables, both of which are 
not statistically significant in specification (2). The results in both specifications (2) and (3) 
remain qualitatively unchanged from specification (1), with both end of wars and higher 
democracy remaining statistically significant. 
To test the robustness of these results, probit tests with the same specifications as in (1)-(3) 
were run for growth thresholds of 2.5 percent (specifications (4)-(6)) and 3.5 percent 
(specifications (7)-(9)). In specifications (4)-(6), in which the growth threshold is set at 2.5 
percent, the results are qualitatively similar to those in specifications (1)-(3), despite about a 
quarter less episodes of growth accelerations in the former relative to the latter. In 
specifications (7)-(9), in which the growth threshold is set at 3.5 percent, end of wars remains 
statistically significant, but improvements in democracy are no longer statistically significant. 
Instead the trade liberalization (specification (7)) and terms of trade (specifications (7)-(9)) 
become statistically significant.  
Complimentary Information 
This section complements the empirical results with the evolution of variables of interest 
(e.g., aid, policies, quality of institutions, and terms of trade) for different groups of SSA 
countries according to their growth performance during 2001-07. More specifically, SSA 
countries were classified into low, medium, and high growth countries during 2001-07. The 
cut-off points under this classification was set so as to ensure that each of these three groups 
57 
 
makes up about a third of the SSA countries.
9
 While such grouping cannot establish cause 
and effect, it allows comparing the experience of fast-growing SSA countries with that of 
slow-growing ones, to see if the story they paint is consistent with the results of panel growth 
and probit regressions analysis. 
The results, which are summarized in Figure 10, suggest that: 
 Democracy and Economic Freedom. High-growth countries seem to have 
significantly higher democracy and economic freedom indicators compared to low-
growth ones (as measured, respectively by the polity2 and economic ICRG 
indicators). 
 Economic policy. High-growth countries have sounder fiscal policy compared to low-
growth countries, but inflation performance has not been significantly different 
relative to other SSA countries since late-1990s, and trade openness has trailed that in 
medium- and low-growth countries.  
 Aid. High-growth countries received significantly higher aid than the other two 
groups during the 1990s, but the situation reversed during the first half of the 2000s. 
Conclusions 
Summarizing, the analysis in this chapter suggests that the growth acceleration in SSA during 
the 2000s is mainly the result of more open and democratic societies, lower incidence of 
armed conflicts, as well as better institutions and policies adopted by the vast majority of 
                                                 
9
 The cut-off points were less than 1 percent for low-growth category, 1-3 percent growth for the medium-
growth category, and over 3 percent growth for the high-growth category. 
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SSA governments. Better terms of trade and higher aid, although having an important role in 
some countries, seem to have played a relatively limited role in the growth acceleration for 
the continent as a whole.  More specifically:  
 Growth accounting suggests that SSA’s growth acceleration during the 2000s 
reflects a combination of higher capital accumulation, possibly reflecting lower 
incidence of armed conflicts, advances in democracy, and stronger policies.  
 Panel growth regressions suggest that, as expected, initial income has a negative 
correlation with growth (seeming to confirm conditional convergence in SSA 
predicted by neoclassical growth models), trade openness has a large positive 
correlation, and armed conflicts have a large negative correlation. While political and 
institutional indicators have a positive correlation with growth, they do not have a 
statistically significant impact, which may be because the positive effects of good 
policies and institutions take a long time, and cannot be captured in standard growth 
regressions.  
 Probit analysis focused on growth acceleration episodes also suggests that trade 
liberalization, end of wars, higher democracy have a statistically significant 
correlation with growth accelerations. At the same time, better terms of trade and 
higher aid do not seem to have a statistically significant correlation with growth 





Figure 10. Aid, Policy, and Institutional Indicators in SSA 1/
Source:IMF World Economic Outlook database, 
1/ SSA countries were classfied into low, medium, and high growth based on their average 
growth during 2001-06. Cutt-off  for each group was selected so that 1/3 of SSA  fell in each 
category (i.e., growth less than 1 percent for the low-growth group, 1-3 percent for the 
medium-growth group, and above 3 percent for the high-growth group).
2/ Average of Polity2 indicator that takes values from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (full 
democracy).
3/ Excludes oil producers (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria).
4/ Index of trade openness takes value 0 and 1. Originally compiled by Sachs and Warner 




































































1981-90 1991-2000 2001-07 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-07 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-07 1981-90 1991-2000 2001-07
Angola              1.8 1.3 12.9 -1.0 -1.6 9.5 -1.5 1.1 -2.0 0.4 -2.7 11.6
Benin               1.6 4.5 4.1 -2.8 0.3 0.5 -6.6 -3.9 -1.2 3.8 4.2 1.7
Botswana            10.6 6.4 5.1 7.4 3.0 3.8 4.7 4.1 4.8 2.7 -1.1 -1.0
Burkina Faso        3.0 5.3 5.6 0.4 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.4 -0.2 -1.6 0.8 2.2
Burundi             4.5 -1.7 2.8 0.8 -2.9 -1.4 1.0 -0.7 -1.1 -0.1 -2.2 -0.3
Cameroon            3.3 1.4 3.6 0.7 -1.5 1.1 1.1 -2.9 -0.2 -0.4 1.3 1.3
Cape Verde          5.2 6.8 6.5 2.8 3.5 2.9 8.9 4.0 5.2 -6.1 -0.5 -2.3
Central African Rep. 1.8 1.0 0.5 -0.7 -1.5 -1.2 0.9 -1.1 -1.5 -1.6 -0.4 0.2
Chad                4.4 2.8 10.5 0.2 -0.8 6.4 24.0 5.7 11.8 -23.8 -6.5 -5.3
Comoros             2.7 1.1 2.2 -0.1 -1.5 -0.4 1.5 0.9 -1.1 -1.6 -2.4 0.7
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 0.7 -5.6 4.7 -2.2 -8.1 1.8 … -4.3 -1.7 … -3.9 3.4
Congo, Republic of 5.8 1.4 3.5 2.6 -1.6 1.0 1.5 0.9 1.6 1.1 -2.5 -0.6
Côte d'Ivoire       1.0 3.1 0.4 -3.1 0.1 -1.6 -4.8 -2.2 -2.2 1.8 2.4 0.6
Equatorial Guinea   2.8 31.6 22.5 -1.8 28.4 19.8 10.2 24.4 15.2 -11.9 4.0 4.7
Eritrea … … 1.9 … … -2.5 … … … … … …
Ethiopia            1.9 2.9 7.1 -1.8 -1.1 3.3 1.3 -2.1 2.0 -3.1 1.0 1.3
Gabon               1.6 1.7 2.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.2 -1.4 -1.9 -0.8 0.4 0.8 0.7
Gambia, The         3.4 4.2 4.9 -0.2 0.4 1.6 -2.5 -1.2 -1.1 2.2 1.5 2.7
Ghana               2.2 4.5 5.4 -1.0 1.2 2.8 … 8.9 4.1 … -7.7 -1.3
Guinea              3.1 4.1 2.7 0.4 0.9 0.6 4.0 3.0 3.3 -3.6 -2.1 -2.7
Guinea-Bissau       2.4 0.9 0.5 0.0 -1.9 -2.2 5.9 -0.9 -4.1 -5.8 -1.0 1.9
Kenya               4.4 1.7 4.5 0.5 -1.9 1.6 0.7 0.1 2.0 -0.3 -2.0 -0.4
Lesotho             4.5 3.8 3.8 2.3 1.9 2.9 2.6 3.9 -0.7 -0.3 -2.0 3.6
Liberia             … … -1.0 … … -3.6 … … … … … …
Madagascar 0.5 1.7 3.3 -2.4 -1.3 -0.4 0.1 -0.5 1.8 -2.4 -0.8 -2.2
Malawi              2.2 3.4 3.8 -0.9 1.2 1.4 -2.1 -2.8 1.8 1.2 3.9 -0.5
Mali                3.0 3.6 5.7 1.0 1.0 2.4 6.7 2.2 0.8 -5.7 -1.2 1.6
Mauritania          2.4 2.9 4.6 -0.3 -0.2 1.3 0.9 0.5 9.6 -1.2 -0.7 -8.3
Mauritius 4.8 6.0 3.6 2.8 4.4 2.4 3.9 5.4 3.1 -1.2 -1.0 -0.7
Mozambique          0.1 6.5 8.6 -0.2 3.0 6.4 4.2 3.4 2.9 -4.4 -0.4 3.5
Namibia             -1.2 3.9 5.1 -4.9 0.7 3.0 -4.4 -1.1 0.9 -0.5 1.8 2.1
Niger               0.0 1.0 5.3 -2.8 -2.6 1.7 -4.2 -4.8 0.6 1.3 2.2 1.2
Nigeria             2.4 1.9 9.6 -0.1 -0.9 6.8 -0.1 -1.3 2.1 0.1 0.4 4.6
Rwanda              2.2 0.7 6.7 -0.8 -0.7 3.6 3.0 0.7 2.7 -3.8 -1.3 0.9
São Tomé & Príncipe -1.5 1.5 6.4 -3.3 -0.6 3.6 … … … … … …
Senegal 2.6 3.1 4.4 -0.2 0.2 1.3 2.9 1.6 2.9 -3.1 -1.4 -1.6
Seychelles 3.6 4.5 1.8 1.3 3.4 -1.6 3.2 6.1 -1.1 -1.9 -2.7 -0.5
Sierra Leone        0.8 -7.6 11.7 0.3 -8.3 8.3 -1.8 -3.2 -2.2 2.1 -5.1 10.6
Somalia             … … … … … … … … … … … …
South Africa        1.5 1.8 4.2 -1.4 -1.2 1.4 -1.8 -2.2 0.0 0.4 1.0 1.4
Sudan 2.5 3.5 7.3 1.0 0.3 4.6 … … … … … …
Swaziland           8.2 2.9 2.5 4.7 -0.5 0.9 … -1.2 -0.2 … 0.7 1.1
Tanzania            3.3 2.9 7.0 0.1 0.0 4.4 -0.4 1.6 7.6 0.4 -1.6 -3.2
Togo                1.7 0.9 1.7 -1.7 -2.4 -1.4 -5.3 -5.7 -4.4 3.6 3.3 3.0
Uganda              3.6 6.2 7.5 0.2 3.1 4.0 … 9.6 6.6 … -6.5 -2.6
Zambia 1.0 -0.2 5.2 -3.1 -2.7 3.2 -4.8 -4.2 0.2 1.7 1.5 3.0
Zimbabwe            4.4 0.6 -5.2 0.1 -1.7 -6.4 -0.9 1.3 -1.3 1.0 -3.0 -5.1
Source: IMF's WEO and World Bank's WDI databases.
Table 1. Sources of Growth in SSA, 1981-2007
Output
Contribution of:
Factor ProductivityPhysical Capital per WorkerOutput per Worker
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Dependent variable is average GDP growth per capita of four-year periods over 1971-2006.
Explanatory variables 1971-2006 1991-2006 1971-2006 1991-2006 1971-2006 1991-2006
Init_Inc -2.74 -7.24 -2.38 -6.20 -1.30 -5.70
(-4.12) *** (-2.6) *** (-1.94) * (-2.48) (-0.48) (-1.21)
Init_Life_Exp 0.03 -0.13 0.05 -0.04 -0.18 0.02
(0.68) (-1.08) (0.76) (-0.33) (-0.72) (0.1)
Gov_Bal 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.16
(1.62) (1.59) (2.65) *** (0.69) (2.02) ** (1.26)
Infl_Avg -0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
(-1.37) (3.36) *** (1.26) (1.02) (1.97) ** (2.26) **
Open_Trade 0.51 3.71 0.26 2.55 1.61 1.00
(0.72) (2.44) *** (0.34) (1.78) * (0.89) (0.73)
CPIA 0.43 0.49 0.40 -0.63 1.65 0.28
(0.75) (0.36) (0.98) (-0.64) (1.32) (0.23)
War -0.87 -1.75 -2.14 -3.65 1.85 -0.92
(-0.97) (-0.90) (-2.72) *** (-2.18) ** (1.45) (-0.58)
ODA_Aid 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.38 0.14 0.22
(1.50) (1.65) (1.86) * (2.01) ** (1.08) (1.39)





0.25 0.45 0.28 0.43
Observations 226 133 268 136 265 132
1
 Includes both country and time fixed effects.
2
 Numbers in paranthesis are robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10 percent level; ** indicates 
significance at 5 percent level; and *** indicates significance at 1 percent level.
3
 Excludes small islands (Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles) for which many data series 
are not available.
4











1.5 percent 2.5 percent 3.5 percent
Angola              2002 2002 2002
Benin               - - -
Botswana            1985, 1995 1985, 1995 1985, 1995
Burkina Faso        1984, 1994 1994 -
Burundi             - - -
Cameroon            - - -
Cape Verde          1992 1992 1992
Central African Rep. - - -
Chad                1997 1997 1997
Comoros             - - -
Congo, Dem. Rep. of - - -
Congo, Republic of 1984 1984 1984
Côte d'Ivoire       - - -
Equatorial Guinea   1988 1988 1988
Eritrea - - -
Ethiopia            2004 2004 2004
Gabon               - - -
Gambia, The         - - -
Ghana               2001 2001 -
Guinea              - - -
Guinea-Bissau       - - -
Kenya               2004 - -
Lesotho             1984, 2000 1984, 2003 1987, 2003
Liberia             - - -
Madagascar - - -
Malawi              1993, 2003 - -
Mali                1985, 1996 1986, 1996 -
Mauritania          2003 - -
Mauritius 1986 1986 1986
Mozambique          1987, 1996 1996 1996
Namibia             2002 2002 2002
Niger               2001 - -
Nigeria             2000 2000 2001
Rwanda              2001 2001 2001
São Tomé & Príncipe 1998 1999 2001
Senegal 1997 - -
Seychelles 1984 1984 1985
Sierra Leone        2001 2001 2001
Somalia             - - -
South Africa        - - -
Sudan 1986, 1997 1986, 1997 1997
Swaziland           1984, 2004 1984 1984
Tanzania            1996 1996 1999
Togo                - - -
Uganda              1992 1992 1992
Zambia 2001 2001 -
Zimbabwe            - - -
Total accelerations 37 28 22
Excluding islands 34 25 19
1/ The filter to generate accelerations uses (i) average growth over a 7 year period 
relative to the previous 4 years should be higher than 2 percentage points, 
and (ii) a threshold of at least 1.5, 2.5, or 3.5 percent growth during the 7 year period.
Growth Threshold
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 A five year lag is allowed between a change in the underlying determinant and a growth acceleration.
The timing of the growth acceleration is the three year window centered on the initiation dates in Table 2.
2
 The underlying variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 whenever the change in the terms of trade
from year t to t-4 is in the upper 10 percent of the entire sample.
3
 Measured by the Sachs-Warner, and Wacziarg-Welch indexes that capture changes in economy's 
openness to trade. The indicator is a dummy that takes value 1 during the first five years of a transition
towards "openness," and 0 otherwise.
4
 The underlying value is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the five-year period beginning 
with the cessation of an armed conflict, and 0 otherwise.
5
 Improvement (deterioration) in democracy take the value 1 during the five-year period beginning with 
a positive (negative) change in the polity2 score from the Polity IV dataset.
6
 An increase in aid is considered if the three-year average exceeds that of the previous period by 
3 percentage points of GDP.






Dependent variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 when growth accelerates and 0 otherwise 
3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
War_End 0.94 0.58 0.54 1.17 0.84 0.72 2.57 1.14 0.96
(3.67)*** (2.99)*** (3.04)*** (4.38)*** (4.21)*** (3.99)*** (5.60)*** (5.67)*** (5.38)***
Higher_Dem 0.59 0.34 0.36 0.64 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.05 0.06
(3.12)*** (2.45)** (2.73)*** (3.04)*** (2.95)*** (2.97)*** (1.09) (0.27) (0.32)
Trade_Lib -0.06 0.16 0.68
(-0.31) (0.72) (2.08)**
TOT 0.51 0.15 0.60 0.14 1.80 0.35
(2.10)** (0.82) (2.17)** (0.70) (3.62)*** (1.77)*
Aid 0.29 0.19 0.16 0.12 -0.37 -0.14
(1.58) (1.41) (0.76) (0.77) (-1.00) (-0.81)
Observations 547 958 1,082 547 958 1082 547 958 1082
Growth episodes included 15/34 31/34 33/34 11/25 23/25 25/25 6/19 17/19 19/19
Pseudo R
2
0.10 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.47 0.09 0.06
1
 Excludes small islands (Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles) for which most data series are not available.
2
 Numbers in paranthesis are robust t-statistics. * indicates significance at 10 percent level, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level; 
and *** indicates significance at 1 percent level.
3
 An acceleration episode is identified by a filter that has the following criteria: (i) growth per capita in a 7 year period has to 
be higher than the previous 4 years by at least two percentage points; (ii) growth during the same 7 year period has to exceed 
a certain threshold (1.5 percent, 2.5 percent, or 3.5 percent); and (iii) level of output per capita during the 7 year period has to be 
higher than the previous 4 years to make sure that the increase is not merely due to a recovery from a previous decline.
1.5 percent 2.5 percent 3.5 percent
Growth Threshold





Chapter 3: Political Budget Cycles in SSA 
Introduction  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Sub-Saharan Africa has made significant strides towards 
democracy since the early 1990s, with the number of democracies in the continent 
increasing steadily over the last decade. In addition, virtually all SSA countries allow 
now opposition parties to challenge incumbents in popular elections, and the number 
of cases when popular opposition parties or coalitions have won multi-party elections 
is gradually growing (e.g. Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, and Senegal). 
Some have expressed concern, however, that while the introduction of political 
competition may have stayed the hand of predatory governments, it has probably 
failed to inspire them to manage the economy better. A study by Block et. al. (2003), 
for example, suggests that multiparty presidential elections in Africa are associated 
with: (i) higher government consumption in GDP; (ii) higher rate of money growth; 
and (iii) higher inflation and exchange rate devaluations. The study also suggests that 
while the relationship between electoral competition and macroeconomic distortions 
peaks with the so-called founding elections (the election that occurred at the time of 
transition from authoritarian rule), it is nonetheless present, albeit at a lesser 
magnitude in successive elections. In view of these findings, Bates (2006) wonders 
whether governments that are subject to electoral risk may be less willing to adhere to 
macroeconomic (particularly fiscal) discipline.
10
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Recent cross-section studies on political budget cycles in new democracies outside 
SSA are consistent with the Block et al findings. Drazen and Brender (2005), for 
example, find that there is a significant political budget cycle in new democracies, but 
becomes less strong over time, as voters gain more experience with elections.  
Using macroeconomic data and presidential elections results for the period 1980-
2005, this paper investigates the following for the SSA: 
 whether competitive elections are associated with higher fiscal deficits and, if 
yes, what is the main channel through which this takes place (i.e., higher 
spending, lower taxes, or a combination of the two);
11
 
 whether, as Africa’s democracies consolidate over time, the magnitude of the 
political budget cycles in the continent tends to decline (as found by Drazen 
and Brender for new democracies); and  
 whether re-election of incumbents is positively correlated with higher fiscal 
deficits during the run-up to election or their term in office. 
                                                 
11
 Block et. al (2003) argue, for example, that incumbents in transition elections are likely to face fewer 
constraints in the form of legislatures, independent central banks, and a free press for increased 
government spending to solidify their basis of support. This reasoning suggests that we should see 
evidence of larger opportunistic political budget cycles in ―founding elections.‖ 
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Some stylized facts 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the number of democracies in SSA has increased steadily 
since the 1990s, with about half of SSA countries currently classified as democracies.  
Reflecting this move toward democracy, elections have become more regular in SSA 
in recent years (Table 1). In the 37 SSA countries that elect the president by popular 
vote, there were 35 presidential elections during 1980-1990 (an average of about 12 
years between presidential election per country), and 99 presidential elections during 
1991-2005 (an average of about 6 years between presidential elections per country).  
Not only have the number of elections increased, but elections have also become 
more competitive. First, in all the 37 SSA countries that elect the president directly, 
the opposition parties are now allowed to contest the incumbent in elections.
12
 
Second, while no opposition candidate won over an incumbent during 1980-1990 (in 
35 presidential elections), during the period 1991-2006 opposition candidate won in 
32 cases (out of 99 presidential elections during the period, or 30 percent of the 
cases). Of these, 15 times the challenger won against the incumbent president, and 17 
other times against the candidate of the same party as the incumbent (such as in the 
case when the term limits were binding). 
The fiscal deficit in SSA countries in recent years has, on average, been significantly 
lower than in the 1980s and 1990s. In the 35 SSA countries that elect the president 
                                                 
12
 In many of these countries, however , elections are not considered completely ―free and fair‖ and, on 
the basis of the World Bank’s PolityIV database, as of 2004 less than half of them (17 countries  out of 
a total of 37 countries that elect the president directly) were classified as democracies (i.e., had a 
nonnegative polity score). 
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directly for which fiscal data for the period 1980-2005 is available, the fiscal deficit 
during the period 2001-2005 averaged 2.7 percent of GDP, compared to about 5.1 
percent of GDP during the period 1980-2000 (see Table 2). As can be seen from 
Figure 2 and Table 2, this decline in fiscal deficits has been observed in most SSA 
countries. Only in 10 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, and Swaziland), representing less 
than one fourth of SSA countries in this sample, was the average fiscal deficit during 
2001-2005 higher than during 1980-2000.  
The fiscal deficit in competitive presidential elections has, on average, been higher 
than in the year preceding the election. As shown in Table 2, during the period 1980-
2000 the fiscal deficit in years of presidential elections averaged 5.9 percent of GDP 
(versus an average deficit of 5.1 percent of GDP during the same period), and during 
2001-2005 the deficit in presidential elections years averaged 3.9 percent of GDP 
(versus an average deficit of 2.7 percent of GDP for the same period).  
The average fiscal deficit in ―founding‖ elections—i.e., the first election in which 
opposition presidential candidates can challenge the incumbent—was 5.8 percent of 
GDP, higher than the 4.7 percent of GDP average in all competitive elections. 
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Does Evidence Support Hypothesis of Political Budget Cycles? 
Estimation 
As in Brender and Drazen (2005), the regression to be used in this analysis on 
whether elections are associated with fiscal policy cycles has the following form: 
   
k
tiittiktikti
Elecdxcfbf ,,,, *'*   
Where tif ,  is a fiscal indicator in country i in year t; tix , is a vector of control variables 
(which will include (i) population between 15 and 64 years of age, (ii) population 65 
years of age and over, (iii) real GDP per capita, and (iv) trade relative to GDP; tElec  
is an electoral dummy; and i is a country fixed effect. The electoral dummy takes 
the value 1 in the year a presidential election takes place when such an election is 
held in the second half of the year, and in the previous year when it is held in the first 
half of the year, and zero otherwise.
13
  
Elections dates for presidential elections in each country are presented in Table 1, 
with dates in bold indicating the first time multiparty presidential elections were held 
in that country.  
The fiscal data (including fiscal deficit, revenues and expenditures) were obtained 
from the WEO database; trade share and population composition into 15-64 years of 
age and over 65 years of age from World Bank’s World Development Indicators; 
whereas election information from a variety of sources, including International 
                                                 
13
 The sensitivity of results for alternative definitions of the election year is also discussed. 
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Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
14
 Binghamton University’s 
Election Results Archive (ERA),
15
 African Elections Database (AED),
16




As in Block et. al (2003), the analysis is restricted to presidential elections in SSA for 
two main reasons. First, given that the autocratic legacy in most SSA countries the 
political power is usually concentrated in the hands of the leader, presidential 
elections in SSA have significantly higher importance than parliamentary elections. 
Second, presidential terms in SSA countries are for fixed terms, reducing the concern 
of the potential bias of estimates if elections are endogenous (i.e., that leaders can call 
early elections when they are still popular).  
Unlike Brender and Drazen (2005), who restrict their study to democracies only, all 
presidential elections (including in non-democracies) where the president is elected 
by popular vote are included in the analysis below, provided that the opposition 
parties could challenge incumbent regimes. One strong reason for this choice is that 
in most cases in which the opposition president was able to unseat the incumbent in 
SSA in early 1990s were not considered democracies. Restricting the study to SSA 
democracies only would reduce considerably the number of observations.
18
  










 As noted above, less than half of the SSA countries that elect the president directly were considered 
as democracies in 2004, and many of them have become democracies only recently. 
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From the 37 SSA countries that elect the president by popular vote, fiscal data are not 
available for two of them (Liberia and  Sao Tome and Principe). Four small or island 
economies for which data is available are also excluded (Cape Verde, Comoros, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Seychelles), given concerns on the quality of their economic 
statistics, as is Zimbabwe, given the lack of true multiparty competition in 
presidential elections in that country. The data set is for the period 1980-2005. During 
this period, there were a total of 108 presidential elections in the 30 SSA countries, 
and in 86 of these cases the opposition parties were allowed to contest the incumbent.  
Results 
As summarized in Table 3, columns (1) and (4), panel least square regressions with 
country fixed effects suggest that presidential elections are associated with higher 
budget deficits in Africa. In years of competitive presidential elections the fiscal 
deficit is higher by about 0.8 percentage points of GDP relative to non-election years 
during the period 1980-2005, and by about 1.2 percentage points of GDP during the 
period 1990-2005. Higher deficits seem to be driven by higher fiscal spending, rather 
than lower taxes. As can be seen in Table 3, the magnitude of the effect of 
presidential elections on (higher) fiscal spending, columns (2) and (5), is similar to 
that on (lower) general government fiscal balance in the balance equation. In addition, 
there does not seem to any election cycle on revenues (the coefficients of the dummy 
variable on election in the revenue equations, columns (3) and (6), are not statistically 
different from zero).  
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There also seems to be support for the hypothesis that, as voters and politicians 
become more familiar with elections and as checks and balances improve with each 
subsequent election, the magnitude of political budget cycle declines. As can be seen 
in Table 4, panel regressions with fixed country effect suggest that when separate 
dummy variables are introduced for the first, second, and later multiparty presidential 
elections, only the variable for the first such election is statistically significant, 
whereas the later elections are not. This is the case for two different specification—
i.e., one in which each of the first two multiparty elections were assigned separate 
dummy variables and the rest of the elections with another, columns (2) and (4), and 
another specification where the first multiparty election was assigned a separate 
dummy variable and the rest of the elections with another, columns (1) and (3). Both 
specifications were tested separately for the periods 1980-2005 and 1990-2005.  
Robustness  
This section discusses a number of robustness tests to the results of the previous 
section, namely: (i) GMM tests given that the lag of the dependent variable is 
included in the specification, and thus the OLS results are potentially biased; (ii) 
applying an alternative definition to the election year; and (iii) discussing the results 
of OLS regressions with fixed country effects on sub samples of the overall sample 
that was used in the previous section.  
GMM Tests 
The results of GMM regressions using the Arellano and Bond approach (1991) seem 
to support OLS results with fixed country effects discussed in the previous section. 
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As can be seen from Table 5, GMM estimates suggest that the impact of presidential 
elections on the fiscal deficit is the same as that obtained from the OLS (Table 3) for 
the period 1980-2005, and broadly similar for the period 1990-2005.  
Definition of Election Year 
OLS regressions using an alternative definition for the election year were also run. 
Under this alternative definition, the electoral dummy takes the value 1 in the same 
calendar year the presidential election takes place when the election is held during 
May-December of that year (compared to the period July-December in the results 
discussed above), and in the previous year when it is held in the first quarter of the 
year (compared to the first half of the year in the results discussed above).  As can be 
seen from Table 5, results for the balance equation for the period 1980-2005 are very 
similar. This is true for the expenditure and revenue equations as well, although the 
results are not shown in Table 5.  
Using Sub samples of the Overall Sample 
To see whether results are sensitive to a particular small set of countries, separate 
regression were run by dividing the overall sample of 30 countries into 3 sub samples: 
(i) the first 15 countries; (ii) the last 15 countries; and (iii) the middle 20 countries. As 
shown in Table 5 results are qualitatively the same, although in some cases the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. Depending on whether the 
period is 1980-2005 or 1990-2005, the fiscal deficit in years of presidential elections 
is between 0.7 and 1.3 percentage points of GDP higher than in non-election years.  
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Do political budget cycles affect chances of reelection? 
Using a panel of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003, Brender and Drazen (2005) 
found no evidence that deficits help reelection in any group of countries—being them 
developed of less developed, new and old democracies, countries with different 
government or electoral systems, and countries with different levels of democracy.
19
  
This section examines whether these findings hold for presidential elections in SSA. 
More specifically, this section asks whether either (i) increased deficits during an 
election year or (ii) loose fiscal policies during the term in office or in the election 
year, raise the probability of reelection of incumbent presidents (or of candidates 
from the same party as the incumbent when they do not, or are not allowed to) run for 
election. To explore these questions data on 108 presidential elections during the 
period 1980-2005 are used, in the same set of 30 SSA countries in which the 
president is elected directly. 
The methodology used here in similar methodology to the one in Brender and Drazen 
(2005). More specifically the analysis below uses a probit regression analysis, with 
variable REELECT being a binary variable that takes value 1 if incumbent is 
reelected and 0 otherwise. Information on whether incumbent is reelected or not is 
collected from the same databases noted above. On this basis I have put together 
Table 6 with all SSA presidents since the 1970s, and combined this information with 
that in Table 1 on the timing of presidential elections and other information on 
presidential candidates in each election for all 30 countries. This was used to 
                                                 
19
 The countries in their study did not include any country from the Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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determine whether the incumbent ran for reelection and, if yes, whether he was 
reelected or not, and if the incumbent did not run whether the candidate from the 
same party was elected or not. In the analysis below two definition of REELECT are 
used, similar to the treatment in Drazen and Brender (2005). More specifically: 
“Narrow” definition: only competitive elections in which the incumbent president is 
running for reelection are included. In the sample of 30 SSA countries for the period 
1980-2005, incumbents ran for reelection in 69 competitive presidential elections (out 
of a total of 108 direct presidential elections during this period), and in 54 cases they 
won reelection (a rate of success of nearly 80 percent)..  
“Expanded” definition: cases in which the incumbent cannot run due to legal term 
limits are added, with the candidate from the same party treated as the incumbent. 
Doing this adds 17 presidential elections compared to the narrow definition, of which 
7 were won by challengers (a success rate of about 40 percent).  
Measures of fiscal performance include two variables—BALCH_term, and 
BALCH_ey. The first variable is calculated as the difference of average fiscal deficit 
in the two years before election with that in the two years before that. The second 
variable is calculated as the difference in the fiscal deficit in the election year with 
that in the pre-election year. Variables on real economic growth (GDP_gr_term and 
GDP_gr_ey) and inflation (infl_term and infl_ey) are calculated in the same way. 
Probit estimation is used to examine the effect of fiscal deficits on the probability of 
reelection. Results in Table 7 suggest that higher fiscal deficits both during the 
election year and the leader’s term in office do not bring reward for incumbent 
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presidents that create them, or for the candidates of the same party as the incumbent 
when the latter does not or cannot run for reelection. Actually, in the narrow sample 
for all presidential elections results suggest that better fiscal balances in the election 
year increase incumbent’s reelection chances.  
Conclusions 
Results of this chapter suggest that while there is evidence of significant political 
budget cycle in SSA during 1980-2005, these results are driven by the impact of 
―founding‖ elections. In addition, fiscal deficits in SSA in recent years have on 
average been significantly lower than during the 1980s and 1990s. Together, these 
seem to suggest that, contrary to the fears expressed by some (including recently by 
Bates), increased democracy in SSA has not only reduced the predatory behavior of 
governments in the continent, but also contributed to improved macroeconomic 
management. Thus, while ―founding‖ elections in SSA presented both the greatest 
incentives and fewest constraints for electoral economic manipulation, as voters in the 
continent have become more experienced with elections, the scope for its politicians 
to induce political budget cycles at the aggregate level has been gradually diminished. 
It may very well be that, as found in two recent papers by Drazen and Eslava, election 
year political manipulation does not take place necessarily through a higher fiscal 
deficit, but can also take the form of a change in the composition of government 
spending to target a fraction of voters at the expense of the others while keeping the 
overall deficit broadly unchanged.  
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The findings in this paper, however, seem to indicate that higher fiscal deficits during 
election years do not seem to improve reelection chances of incumbents, and this 
finding is robust to the definition of election year. Actually, similar to what was found 
by Drazen and Brender for developed countries and established democracies, the 
results in one the four regressions shown in Table 7 (the narrow sample for all 
presidential elections) suggest that better (not worse) fiscal balances in the election 






















































































































































































































































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Percent of SSA 
democracies 
Number of SSA 
democracies 
1/ Countries with polity2 indicator from the World Bank's CPI database with a value higher than 0 are classified as democracies. Polity2  
takes values from -10 (least democratic) to +10 (most democratic). 
79 
 
Country Presidential Election Dates
Angola 29 September 1992 (I).
Benin 24 March 1991 (O,I), 18 March 1996 (O,I), 4 March 2001 (I), 5 March 2006 (O,S)
Botswana None
Burkina Faso 2/ 1 December 1991 (I), 15 November 1998 (I), 13 November 2005 (I).
Burundi 31 August 1984 (I), 1 June 1993 (O,I).
Cameroon 4 April 1980 (I), 14 January 1984 (I), 24 April 1988 (I), 11 October 1992 (I), 12 October 1997 (I), 11 October 2004 (I).
Cape Verde 17 February 1991 (O,I), 11 February 2001 (O,S), 12 February 2006 (I).
Central African Republic 3/ 15 March 1981 (I), 25 October 1992 (I), 22 August 1993 (O,I), 19 September 1999 (I), 13 March 2005 (I).
Chad 2 June 1996 (I), 20 May 2001 (I), 3 May 2006 (I).
Comoros 22 October 1978 (I), 30 September 1984 (I), 11 March 1990 (I), 6 March 1996 (I), 17 March 2002 (I), 14 May 2006 (O,S).
Congo 2 June 1992 (O,I), 10 March 2002 (I).
Côte d'Ivoire 12 October 1980 (I), 27 October 1985 (I), 28 October 1990 (I), 22 October 1995 (I), 22 October 2000 (O,I).
Democratic Republic of the Congo December 1977 (I), September 1982 (I), 30 July 2006 (I).
Equatorial Guinea 4/ 25 June 1989 (I), 25 September 1996 (I), 15 December 2002 (I).
Eritrea None.
Ethiopia None.
Gabon 30 December 1979 (I), 9 November 1986 (I), 5 December 1993 (I), 6 December 1998 (I), 27 November 2005 (I).
Gambia 4 May 1982 (I), 11 March 1987 (I), 29 April 1992 (I), 26 September 1996 (I), 18 October 2001 (I).
Ghana 18 June 1979 (O,I), 3 November 1992 (I), 7 December 1996 (I), 28 December 2000 (O,S), 7 December 2004 (I).
Guinea 9 May 1982 (I), 19 December 1993 (I), 14 December 1998 (I), 21 December 2003 (I).
Guinea-Bissau 7 August 1994 (I), 28 November 1999 (O,S), 19 June 2005 (O,S).
Kenya 29 December 1992 (I), 29 December 1997 (I), 27 December 2002 (O,S).
Lesotho None. 
Liberia 15 October 1985 (I), 19 July 1997 (O,S), 11 October 2005 (O,S).
Madagascar 7 November 1982 (I), 12 March 1989 (I), 25 October 1992 (O,I), 3 November 1996 (O,I), 16 December 2001 (O,I).
Malawi 17 May 1994 (O,I), 15 June 1999 (I), 20 May 2004 (S).
Mali 19 June 1979 (I), 9 June 1985 (I), 26 April 1992 (O,S), 4 May 1997 (I), 28 April 2002 (O,S).
Mauritania 24 January 1992 (O,I), 12 December 1997 (I), 7 November 2003 (I).
Mauritius None.
Mozambique 27 October 1994 (I), 3 December 1999 (I), 1 December 2004 (S).
Namibia 7 December 1994 (I), 30 November 1999 (I), 15 November 2004 (S).
Niger 27 March 1993 (O,S), 7 July 1996 (O,I), 17 October 1999 (O,S), 16 November 2004 (I).
Nigeria 11 August 1979 (O,I), 6 August 1983 (I), 12 June 1993 (O,S), 27 February 1999 (O,I), 19 April 2003 (I).
Rwanda 24 December 1978 (I), 19 December 1983 (I), 19 December 1988 (I), 25 August 2003 (I).
Sao Tome and Principe 3 March 1991 (O,S), 21 July 1996 (I), 29 July 2001 (S).
Senegal 26 February 1978 (I), 27 February 1983 (I), 28 February 1988 (I), 21 February 1993 (I), 27 February 2000 (O,I).
Seychelles 23 July 1993 (I), 20 March 1998 (I), 31 August 2001 (I).
Sierra Leone March 1976 (I), 1 October 1985 (S), 26 February 1996 (O,S), 14 May 2002 (I).
Somalia 23 December 1986 (I).
South Africa None.
Swaziland None.
Togo 30 December 1979 (I), 21 December 1986 (I), 25 August 1993 (I), 21 June 1998 (I), 1 June 2003 (I), 24 April 2005 (S).
Uganda 9 May 1996 (I), 12 March 2001 (I), 23 February 2006 (I).
United Republic of Tanzania 26 October 1980 (I), 27 October 1985 (S), 28 October 1990 (I), 29 October 1995 (S), 29 October 2000 (I), 14 December 2005 (S).
Zambia 12 December 1978 (I), 27 October 1983 (I), 26 October 1988 (I), 31 October 1991 (O,I), 18 November 1996 (I), 27 December 2001 (S).
Zimbabwe March 1990 (I), 16 March 1996 (I), 9 March 2002 (I).
1/ Dates in bold indicate the first time when multiparty presidential elections were held in each SSA country. "I" denotes whether
 incumbent reelected, and "O,I" if opposition challenger wins running against incumbent, "O,S" if opposition challenger wins against a 
candidate from incumbents party, and "S" if candidate from the incumbent party wins (such as in the case of term limit for the incumbent).
2/ The opposition boycotted the 1991 elections but the elections was scheduled as a multiparty presidential election.
3/ The 1992 elections were annuled by the Supreme Court due to widespread regularities.
4/ The 1996 and 2002 elections are listed as "multiparty", although the incumbent won with over 97 percent of the vote in both cases. In 1996, 
the opposition boycoted the election.




Number of Number of
During Whole Period Pres Elec Only Pres Elections During Whole Period Pres Elec Only Pres Elections
Benin -3.1 -3.0 3 -1.8 -2.5 1
Burkina Faso -3.7 -1.7 2 -4.1 -4.9 1
Burundi -6.0 -5.5 2 -4.5 - 0
Cameroon -3.2 -4.2 4 1.5 -0.5 1
Cape Verde -9.9 -11.4 2 -4.2 -6.3 1
Central African Republic -3.4 -5.6 3 -2.4 -2.2 1
Chad -4.1 -5.7 2 -4.2 -0.4 1
Comoros -6.2 -6.6 3 -2.5 -1.8 2
Congo -4.4 -13.1 1 2.3 -0.7 1
Cote D'Ivoire -7.4 -5.7 5 -1.3 - 0
Dem. Rep. of Congo -8.5 -5.2 1 -3.5 - 0
Equatorial Guinea -7.5 -20.2 2 11.1 10.9 1
Gabon -1.8 -10.2 3 6.2 9.4 1
Gambia -5.1 -5.5 4 -7.5 -13.9 1
Ghana -5.9 -8.8 3 -4.1 -3.1 1
Guinea -2.9 -0.7 3 -1.8 -6.1 1
Guinea-Bissau -8.2 -5.5 2 -11.8 -15.0 1
Kenya -3.0 -4.7 2 -2.6 -3.9 1
Madagaskar -5.8 -5.3 4 -5.1 -4.4 1
Malawi -6.9 -6.3 2 -6.7 -6.5 1
Mali -4.7 -3.8 3 -2.8 -3.2 1
Mauritania -4.9 -3.1 2 -7.4 -11.8 1
Mozambique -5.8 -3.2 2 -4.7 -4.3 1
Namibia -1.5 -2.3 2 -3.9 -4.4 1
Niger -3.7 -3.5 3 -3.0 -3.5 1
Nigeria 1.7 0.4 3 1.3 -4.2 1
Rwanda -4.9 -4.3 2 -1.0 -2.5 1
Senegal -2.2 -2.8 4 -2.0 - 0
Seychelles -6.8 -8.8 2 -4.5 -9.9 1
Sierra Leone -8.2 -6.7 2 -6.0 -8.8 1
Togo -4.9 -6.5 3 0.1 0.3 2
Uganda -4.6 -5.9 2 -2.9 -0.6 1
Un. Rep. of Tanzania -3.8 -4.0 5 -2.0 -3.2 1
Zambia -8.8 -6.6 4 -4.8 -7.2 1
Zimbabwe -7.9 -8.8 2 -4.7 -7.0 1
SSA Average -5.1 -5.9 3 -2.7 -3.9 1
Source: WEO database for fiscal data. 
2001-2005
Table 2. Fiscal Deficit in SSA Countries with Direct Presidential Elections, 1980-2005
1980-2000








Balance Exp Rev Balance Exp Rev 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dummy for Presidential Elections -0.81** 0.84 -0.02 -1.17*** 1.46*** 0.27 
(-2.02) (1.55) (-0.04) (-2.99) (3.2) (0.74) 
Lag of Dependent Variable 0.53*** 0.58*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.53*** 0.58*** 
(16.54) (20.96) (17.76) (10.05) (13.56) (14.48) 
GDP per capita -1.04 2.48** 1.76* -0.90 2.04 1.15 
(-1.33) (2.33) (1.68) (-0.74) (1.42) (0.99) 
Population between 15 and 64 years of age 0.39*** 0.05 0.44** 0.59*** 0.04 0.50*** 
(2.92) (0.29) (2.52) (3.34) (0.21) (2.95) 
Population 65 and over years of age -0.61 0.94 0.25 -2.44* 0.78 -1.12 
(-0.88) (1.01) (0.27) (-1.89) (0.52) (-0.91) 
Trade share to GDP 0.01* 0.01 0.03*** 0.03 -0.01 0.02** 
(1.84) (1.32) (2.80) (3.34) (-0.82) (2.44) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.70 0.69 0.47 0.75 0.81 
F-statistics 17.97 52.60 49.02 13.16 42.20 60.78 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.98 1.76 1.67 1.95 1.97 1.94 
No of countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Total panel 767 767 767 480 480 480 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** significance at 5 percent level, and *** significance at 1 percent 
level. 
Multiparty Pres Elec Only 
1990-2005 
Table 3. The Political Budget Cycle in Sub-Saharan Africa, OLS Panel Estimates with Fixed Country Effects 





Balance Balance Balance Balance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Elec_comp_n1 -1.62** -1.62** -1.91*** -1.90*** 
(-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.98) (-2.97) 
Elec_comp_n2 0.01 -0.52 
(-0.15) (-0.79) 
Elec_comp_later -0.41 -0.69 -0.81* -1.04* 
(-0.86) (-1.06) (-1.73) (-1.7) 
Lag of Dependent Variable 0.53*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 
(16.48) (16.48) (10.03) (10.03) 
GDP per capita -1.07 -1.05 -0.94 -0.91 
(3.83) (-1.34) (-0.78) (-0.74) 
Population between 15 and 64 years of age 0.38*** 0.38* 0.57*** 0.58*** 
(2.82) (2.87) (3.21) (3.25) 
Population 65 and over years of age -0.60 -0.61 -2.37* -2.40* 
(-0.86) (-0.87) (-1.84) (-1.86) 
Trade share to GDP 0.01 0.01* 0.03*** 0.03*** 
(1.76) (1.76) (3.23) (3.23) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.47 
F-statistics 17.56 18.08 12.89 12.53 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.98 1.98 1.96 1.96 
No of countries 30 30 30 30 
Total panel 767 767 480 480 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** significance at 5 percent level, and *** significance at 1 percent 
level. 






1980-2005 1990-2005 1980-2005 1990-2005 1980-2005 1990-2005 1980-2005 1990-2005 1980-2005 1990-2005 
Dependent Variable: Deficit 
Dummy for Competitive Presidential Elections -0.81*** -1.05** -0.93** -1.29*** -0.99 -1.23** -0.72 -1.07** -0.97* -1.33** 
(-2.95) (-2.10) (-2.32) (-3.28) (-1.52) (-2.01) (-1.49) (-2.25) (1.80) (-2.44) 
Lag of Dependent Variable 0.52*** 0.44*** 0.53*** 0.44*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.45*** 0.25*** 0.52*** 0.43*** 
(36.79) (7.73) (16.59) (10.07) (12.36) (8.77) (9.59) (3.95) (13.08) (7.79) 
GDP per capita -2.78*** -1.35 -1.05 -0.92 -2.33* -4.4** -0.08 2.59* -0.82 -1.93 
(-2.79) (-0.25) (-1.34) (-0.76) (-1.91) (-2.29) (0.08) (1.77) (-0.72) (-1.04) 
Population between 15 and 64 years of age 0.67*** 1.83 0.39*** 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.55** 0.23 0.58** 0.38** 0.62*** 
(2.97) (1.10) (2.93) (3.34) (2.62) (2.18) (1.25) (2.28) (2.29) (2.71) 
Population 65 and over years of age -1.62 -3.26 -0.61 -2.39* -1.59* -2.35 2.54** -1.08 -0.60 -3.53** 
(-1.15) (-1.48) (-0.87) (-1.85) (-1.75) (-1.49) (2.05) (0.42) (-0.69) (-2.02) 
Trade share to GDP 0.03** 0.00 0.01* 0.03*** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03*** 
(1.98) (0.01) (1.84) (3.36) (1.23) (2.49) (1.35) (2.57) (1.41) (2.84) 
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.53 0.47 0.39 0.42 0.47 
F-statistics 18.03 13.27 15.24 14.51 17.64 8.55 15.74 12.48 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.97 1.93 1.90 1.80 2.08 2.11 1.93 1.92 
No of countries 30 30 30 30 15 15 15 15 20 20 
Total panel 762 480 767 480 384 240 384 240 508 320 
1/ Arellano-Bond approach. 
2/ Dummy variable takes value 1 in the year presidential election takes place if elections is held during April-December,  
and in the previous year if election held in January-March of the year. 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. 
* denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** significance at 5 percent level, and *** significance at 1 percent level. 








Name Period Party Pres Elected Directly 
Angola António Agostinho Neto  11 Nov 1975 - 10 Sep 1979 (+) MPLA Y 
José Eduardo dos Santos  10 Sep 1979 -                    MPLA Y 
Benin Mathieu Kérékou  26 Oct 1972 -  4 Apr 1991 military/PRPB Y 
Nicéphore Dieudonné Soglo 4 Apr 1991 -  4 Apr 1996 PRB Y 
Mathieu Kérékou 4 Apr 1996 -  6 Apr 2006 FARD Y 
Yayi Boni  6 Apr 2006 -   n/p Y 
Botswana Seretse Khama  30 Sep 1966 - 13 Jul 1980 (+) BDP N 
Quett Ketumile Joni Masire 13 Jul 1980 - 31 Mar 1998 BDP N 
Festus Gontebanye Mogae 1 Apr 1998 -  BDP N 
Burkina Faso Blaise Compaoré 24 Dec 1991 -  ODP-MT, CDP  Y 
Burundi Michel Micombero 28 Nov 1966 -  1 Nov 1976 (+1983) military/UPRONA Y 
Jean-Baptiste Bagaza 2 Nov 1976 -  3 Sep 1987 military/UPRONA Y 
Pierre Buyoya 3 Sep 1987 - 10 Jul 1993 military/UPRONA Y 
Melchior Ndadaye 10 Jul 1993 - 21 Oct 1993 (+)a FRODEBU Y 
Cyprien Ntaryamira 5 Feb 1994 -  6 Apr 1994 (+)a FRODEBU Y 
Sylvestre Ntibantunganya  6 Apr 1994 - 25 Jul 1996  (acting to 1 Oct 1994) Y 
Pierre Buyoya 25 Jul 1996 - 20 Apr 2003 UPRONA Y 
Domitien Ndayizeye 30 Apr 2003 - 26 Aug 2005 FRODEBU (transitional) Y 
Pierre Nkurunziza 26 Aug 2005 -  CNDD-FDD Y 
Cameroon Ahmadou Babatoura Ahidjo 1 Jan 1960 -  6 Nov 1982 (+1989) UC, UNC (1) Y 
Paul Biya  6 Nov 1982 - UNC, RDPC Y 
Cape Verde Aristides Maria Pereira  5 Jul 1975 - 22 Mar 1991 PAIGC, PAICV  Y 
António Manuel Mascarenhas Gomes Monteiro   22 Mar 1991 - 22 Mar 2001 MPD Y 
Pedro Verona Rodrigues Pires 22 Mar 2001 -  PAICV  Y 
Central African Republic David Dacko 20 Sep 1979 -  1 Sep 1981 UDC Y 
André Dieudonné Kolingba   21 Sep 1985 - 22 Oct 1993 RDC Y 
Ange - Félix Patassé 22 Oct 1993 - 15 Mar 2003 MLPC Y 
François Bozizé 15 Mar 2003 -  military, n/p Y 
Chad Hissène Habré 7 Jun 1982 -  1 Dec 1990 FAN, UNIR Y 
Jean Alingue Bawoyeu 1 Dec 1990 -  2 Dec 1990  (interim) Y 
Idriss Déby Itno 2 Dec 1990 - MPS (5) Y 
Comoros Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane 25 Oct 1978 - 26 Nov 1989 Y 
Said Mohamed Djohar 26 Nov 1989 - 29 Sep 1995 UDZIMA Y 
Said Mohamed Djohar 26 Jan 1996 - 25 Mar 1996 UDZIMA Y 
Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim 25 Mar 1996 -  6 Nov 1998 (UNDC) Y 
Tajiddine Ben Said Massounde 6 Nov 1998 - 29 Apr 1999 (interim) Y 
Azali Assoumani  29 Apr 1999 - 20 Jan 2002 (military) Y 
Hamada Madi Bolero                 20 Jan 2002 - 26 May 2002 (interim)       Y 
Azali Assoumani  26 May 2002 - 26 May 2006 Y 
Ahmed Abdallah Sambi  26 May 2006 -   Y 
Congo Denis Sassou-Nguesso 8 Feb 1979 - 31 Aug 1992   PCT Y 
Pascal Lissouba 31 Aug 1992 - 15 Oct 1997   UPADS  Y 
Denis Sassou-Nguesso 25 Oct 1997 -               PCT Y 
Côte d ' Ivoire Félix Houphouët - Boigny  7 Aug 1960 -  7 Dec 1993 PDCI-RDA Y 
Aimé Henri Konan Bédié 7 Dec 1993 - 25 Dec 1999 PDCI-RDA Y 
Robert Guéi  25 Dec 1999 - 25 Oct 2000 military Y 
Laurent Gbagbo 26 Oct 2000 -  FPI   Y 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Joseph Kasavubu 1 Jul 1960 - 25 Nov 1965 ABAKO Y 
Mobutu Sese Seko 25 Nov 1965 - 16 May 1997 military/MPR Y 
Laurent - Désiré Kabila 17 May 1997 - 16 Jan 2001 AFDL Y 
Joseph Kabila  17 Jan 2001 -   AFDL, n/p, PPRD Y 
Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo 12 Oct 1982 -  PDGE  Y 
Eritrea Issayas Afeworki 24 May 1993 - PFDJ N 
Ethiopia Negaso Gidada 22 Aug 1995 -  8 Oct 2001 OPDO N 
Girma Wolde-Giyorgis Lucha 8 Oct 2001 -  EPRDF N 
Gabon Gabriel Léon M ' Ba  17 Ago 1960 - 28 Nov 1967 BDG Y 
Omar Bongo 28 Nov 1967 - BDG/PDG Y 
Gambia Dawda Kairaba Jawara 24 Apr 1970 - 22 Jul 1994 PPP Y 
Yahya A. J. J. Jammeh    18 Oct 1996 -  APRC Y 
Ghana Jerry John Rawlings 4 Jun 1979 - 24 Sep 1979 military 
Hilla Limann 24 Sep 1979 - 31 Dec 1981 PNP Y 
Jerry John Rawlings 7 Jan 1993 -  7 Jan 2001 NDC Y 
John Agyekum Kufuor  7 Jan 2001 - NPP Y 
Guinea Ahmed Sékou Touré 28 Jan 1961 - 26 Mar 1984 PDG  Y 
Louis Lansana Beavogui  26 Mar 1984 -  3 Apr 1984 PDG (interim head of State) Y 
Lansana Conté 3 Apr 1984 -   military, PUP    Y 
Guinea-Bissau João Bernardo Vieira 16 May 1984  -  7 May 1999 PAIGC Y 
Malam Bacai Sanhá 13 May 1999 - 17 Feb 2000 PAIGC (acting) Y 
Kumba Ialá 17 Feb 2000 - 14 Sep 2003 PRS Y 
Henrique Pereira Rosa  28 Sep 2003 -  1 Oct 2005 n/p (interim) Y 
João Bernardo Vieira 1 Oct 2005 -  n/p Y 




Name Period Party Pres Elected Directly 
Kenya Jomo Kenyatta  12 Dec 1964 - 22 Aug 1978 KANU Y 
Daniel arap Moi  22 Aug 1978 - 30 Dec 2002 KANU Y 
Mwai Kibaki 30 Dec 2002 -  NARC/DP  Y 
Liberia William Richard Tolbert 23 Jul 1971 - 12 Apr 1980 TWP Y 
Samuel Kanyon Doe 25 Jul 1984 -  9 Sep 1990 NDPL Y 
Ghankay Charles Taylor 2 Aug 1997 - 11 Aug 2003 NPP   Y 
Moses Zeh Blah 11 Aug 2003 - 14 Oct 2003 NPP Y 
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf  16 Jan 2006 -  UP Y 
Madagascar Didier Ratsiraka 4 Jan 1976 - 27 Mar 1993 FNDR/AREMA Y 
Albert Zafy  27 Mar 1993 -  5 Sep 1996 UNDD Y 
Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana   5 Sep 1996 -  9 Feb 1997 AVI (acting) Y 
Didier Ratsiraka 9 Feb 1997 -  6 May 2002 AREMA Y 
Marc Ravalomanana 6 May 2002 -  TIM Y 
Malawi Hastings Kamuzu Banda 6 Jul 1966 - 21 May 1994 MCP Y 
Elson Bakili Muluzi 21 May 1994 - 24 May 2004 UDF Y 
Bingu wa Mutharika 24 May 2004  -  UDF Y 
Mali Moussa Traoré 19 Jun 1979 - 26 Mar 1991  UDPM     Y 
Alpha Oumar Konaré 8 Jun 1992 -  8 Jun 2002 ADEMA Y 
Amadou Toumani Touré 8 June 2002 - n/p Y 
Mauritania Moktar Ould Daddah 20 Aug 1961 - 10 Jul 1978 PRM, PPM Y 
Maaouya Ould Ahmed Taya 18 Apr 1992 -  3 Aug 2005 PRDS Y 
Mozambique Samora Moisés Machel  25 Jun 1975 - 19 Oct 1986 FRELIMO Y 
Joaquim Alberto Chissano 6 Nov 1986 -  2 Feb 2005 FRELIMO Y 
Armando Emílio Guebuza 2 Feb 2005 -   FRELIMO  Y 
Namibia Samuel Daniel Nujoma  21 Mar 1990 - 21 Mar 2005 SWAPO Y 
Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba 21 Mar 2005 -  SWAPO Y 
Niger Ali Saïbou 18 Dec 1989 - 16 Apr 1993 MNSD  Y 
Mahamane Ousmane 16 Apr 1993 - 27 Jan 1996 CDS Y 
Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara 7 Aug 1996 - 11 Apr 1999 UNIRD Y 
Mamadou Tandja 22 Dec 1999 -   MNSD Y 
Nigeria Shehu Shagari  1 Oct 1979 - 31 Dec 1983 NPN  Y 
Olusegun Obasanjo  29 May 1999 -    PDP Y 
Rwanda Juvénal Habyarimana 5 Jul 1973 -  6 Apr 1994  military/MRND Y 
Théodore Sindikubwabo 9 Apr 1994 - 19 Jul 1994 MRND Y 
Pasteur Bizimungu 19 Jul 1994 - 24 Mar 2000 FPR Y 
Paul Kagame 24 Mar 2000 - FPR Y 
Sao Tome and Principe Manuel Pinto da Costa    12 Jul 1975 -  4 Mar 1991  MLSTP  Y 
Leonel Mário d ' Alva 4 Mar 1991 -  3 Apr 1991 MLSTP Y 
Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada 3 Apr 1991 - 15 Aug 1995 n/p, ADI Y 
Miguel dos Anjos Trovoada  21 Aug 1995 -  3 Sep 2001 ADI Y 
Fradique de Menezes         3 Sep 2001 - 16 Jul 2003 ADI, MDFM  Y 
Fradique de Menezes 23 Jul 2003 - MDFM   Y 
Senegal Léopold Sédar Senghor  5 Sep 1960 - 31 Dec 1980 UPS/PSS Y 
Abdou Diouf   1 Jan 1981 -  1 Apr 2000 PSS Y 
Me Abdoulaye Wade 1 Apr 2000 - PDS Y 
Seychelles James Richard Mancham  29 Jun 1976 -  5 Jun 1977 Y 
France - Albert René  5 Jun 1977 - 14 Apr 2004 FPPS  Y 
James Alix Michel 14 Apr 2004 - FPPS   Y 
Sierra Leone Siaka Probyn Stevens 21 Apr 1971 - 28 Nov 1985 APC Y 
Joseph Saidu Momoh 28 Nov 1985 - 29 Apr 1992          APC Y 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 29 Mar 1996 - 25 May 1997 SLPP Y 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 10 Mar 1998 -  SLPP Y 
Togo Gnassingbé Eyadéma 14 Apr 1967 -  5 Feb 2005 military, RPT Y 
Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé 5 Feb 2005 - 25 Feb 2005 RPT Y 
Abbas Bonfoh 25 Feb 2005 -  4 May 2005 RPT  Y 
Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé 4 May 2005 -  RPT Y 
Uganda Idi Amin Dada 25 Jan 1971 - 13 Apr 1979  military Y 
Yusufu Kironde Lule 13 Apr 1979 - 20 Jun 1979 UNLF Y 
Godfrey Lukongwa Binaisa 20 Jun 1979 - 12 May 1980 UNLF Y 
Apolo Milton Obote 15 Dec 1980 - 27 Jul 1985 UPC Y 
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 26 Jan 1986 -   military/NRM Y 
United Republic of Tanzania Julius Kambarage Nyerere 26 Apr 1964 -  5 Nov 1985 TANU/CCM  Y 
Ali Hassan Mwinyi 5 Nov 1985 - 23 Nov 1995 CCM Y 
Benjamin William Mkapa 23 Nov 1995 - 21 Dec 2005 CCM Y 
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete 21 Dec 2005 -  CCM Y 
Zambia Kenneth David Kaunda 24 Oct 1964 -  2 Nov 1991 UNIP Y 
Frederick J. T. Chiluba   2 Nov 1991 -  2 Jan 2002 MMD Y 
Levy Patrick Mwanawasa 2 Jan 2002 -  MMD  Y 
Zimbabwe Robert Gabriel Mugabe 18 Apr 1980 - 31 Dec 1987 ZANU Y 
Source: [COMPLETE]. 
Table 6 (concluded). Sub-Saharan Africa: Presidents of the Republic, 1975-2005 
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1981-2005 1990-2005 1981-2005 1990-2005
Dependent variable: Reelect
Balch_term 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.81) (0.78) (1.16) (1.18)
Balch_ey 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
(0.97) (0.77) (1.10) (0.75)
GDP_gr_term -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
(-0.98) (-0.94) (-0.46) (-0.37)
GDP_gr_ey -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02
(-1.51) (-1.47) (-0.96) (-0.77)
Infl_term -0.03* -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.81) (-1.86) (-0.98) (-1.06)
Infl_ey 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.94) (0.75) (0.72) (0.50)
Constant 0.84*** 0.80*** 0.55*** 0.51***
(4.28) (3.97) (3.52) (3.1)
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.05
Observations 69 66 86 83
of which: reelection of incumbent 54 51 61 58
Z-statistics are in parenthesis.
* denotes significance at 10 percent level, ** significance at 5 percent level, and *** significance at 1 percent level.
Narrow Definition Expanded Definition




Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J., 2001, ―An African Success Story: 
Botswana,‖ published in ―In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narrative on Economic 
Growth,‖ edited by Dani Rodrik‖, Princeton University Press, 2003. 
 
Alt, J., and Lassen, D., 2005, ―The political budget cycle is where you can’t see it: 
Transparency and fiscal manipulation‖, EPRU Working Paper No. 2005-03. 
Berg, Andrew, Shekhar Aiyar, Mumtaz Hussain, Shaun Roache, Tokhir Mirzoev, and 
Amber Mahone, 2007, The Macroeconomics of Scaling Up Aid: Lessons from Recent 
Experience, IMF Occasional Paper No. 253 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund). 
Bates, R., ―Beyond the ballot box‖, IMF Finance and Development, December 2006, 
Volume 43, Number 4 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/12/bates.htm). 
Bates, R., 1981, ―Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of 
Agricultural Policies,‖ Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Block, S., Ferree, K., and Singh, S., ―Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections 
and Political Business Cycles in Africa," Journal of African Economies, Vol. 12 
(September), pp. 444-68. 
Block, S., 2002, Journal of Development Economics‖, Vol 67 (2002), pp 205-228. 
Boadi, G. (Editor), 2004, ―Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress,‖ 
Colorado: Lunne Rienner Publishers, Inc.. 
Boone, Peter, 1996, ―Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,‖ European 
Economic Review, Vol. 40 (February), pp. 289–329. 
Bosworth, B., and Collins, S., 2003, ―The Empirics of Growth: An Update,‖ 
(http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2003/0922globaleconomics_bosw
orth/20030307.pdf). 
Bratton. M., and de Walle, N., 1997, ―Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime 
Transformations in Comparative Perspective,‖ Cambridge University Press. 
Brender A., and Drazen, A., ―Political budget cycles in new versus established 
democracies‖, 2005, Journal of Monetary Economics, 52(2005), pp. 1271-1295. 
Brender A., and Drazen, A., 2008, ―How do budget deficits and economic growth 
affect reelection prospects? Evidence from a large cross-section of countries,‖ 
American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 5, December 2008, pp. 2203-20. 
88 
 
Brender, A., ―The effect of fiscal performance on local government election results in 
Israel: 1989-1998‖, Journal of Public Economics, 87 (2003), pp 2187-2205. 
Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar, 2000, ―Aid, Policies and Growth,‖ Vol. 90 
(September), pp. 847–68. 
Caselli, F., 2005, ―Accounting for Cross-Country Income Differences,‖ CEP 
Discussion Paper No 667. 
Clemens, Michael, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, 2004, ―Counting Chickens 
When They Hatch: The Short-Term Effect of Aid on Growth,‖ Center for Global 
Development, Working Paper No. 44 (Washington). 
Collier, P., 1997, The Failure of Conditionality,‖ in Catherine Gwin and Joan M. 
Nelson (editors), ―Perspectives on Aid and Development,‖ Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press.  
Collier, P., and Jan W. Gunning, 1998, ―Explaining African Economic Performance,‖ 
Journal of Economic Literature 37 (March): 64–111. 
Collier, P., and Jan W. Gunning, 1999, ―Why Has Africa Grown Slowly,‖ Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 13 (3): 3–22. 
Collier., P., 2007, ―The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and 
What Can Be Done About It,‖ Oxford University Press Inc.. 
Collier, P., et. al., 2008, ―The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa: 
1960-2000,‖ Cambridge University Press, New York.  
Collins, S., 2004, ―International Financial Integration and Growth in Developing 
Countries: Issues and Implications for Africa, Journal of African Studies, Vol. 13, 
Supplement 2. 
Collins, S. and B.P. Bosworth, 1996, "Economic Growth in East Asia: Accumulation 
versus Assimilation," Brookings Papers in Economic Activity, 2, pp.135-203.  
De la Fuente, A., and Domenech, R., 2002, ―Human Capital in Growth Regressions: 
How Much Difference Does Data Quality Make? An Update and Further Results,‖ 
CEPR Discussion Papers No. 3587. 
Doppelhofer, G., Miller, R., and Sala-i-Martin, S., 2000, ―Determinants of Long-
Term Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates Approach, NBER 
Working Paper W7750.  




Drazen A., and M. Eslava, 2010, ―Electoral Manipulation via Voter-Friendly 
Spending: Theory and Evidence,‖Journal of Development Economics, Volume 92, 
Issue 1, May 2010, pp 39-52. 
Drazen, A., 2000, ―The political business cycle after 25 years‖, in NBER 
Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15. 
Easterly, W., 2006, ―The White Man’s Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the 
Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good,‖ Penguin Press.  
Easterly, William, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, 2004, ―New Data, New 
Doubts: A Comment on Burnside and Dollar’s Aid, Policies, and Growth,‖ American 
Economic Review, Vol. 94 (June), pp. 774–80. 
Easterly, W., 2001, ―The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics,‖ Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Eaton, J., and Kortum, S., 2001, ―Trade in Capital Goods,‖ European Economic 
Review, 45(7): 1995-1235. 
Eifert, B., 2003, ―Political Equality and the Performance of African Economies, 
1972-1999.‖ Senior honors thesis, Department of Economics, Stanford University. 
Frankel, F., 2003, ―Comments on Bosworth and Collins, The Empirics of Growth: An 
Update‖ 
(http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~jfrankel/Comments_on_Bosworth_and_Collins.pdf). 
Hansen, Henrik, and Finn Tarp, 2001, ―Aid and Growth Regressions,‖ Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 64 (April), pp. 547–70. 
Hausmann, R., Pritchett, L., and Rodrik, D., 2004, ―Growth Accelerations,‖  
KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-030.  
Hayward, F., (editor), 1987, ―Elections in Independent Africa,‖ Colorado: WestView 
Press, Inc... 
Herbst, J., 2000, ―States and Power in Africa,‖ Princeton University Press. 
Iradian, G., 2009, ―What Explains the Rapid Growth in Transition Economies,‖ IMF 
Staff Papers, April, 14, 2009 (http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/imfsp/journal/vaop/ncurrent/pdf/imfsp20091a.pdf). 
Joseph, R. (editor), 1999, ―State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa,‖ Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc... 
Lindberg, S., 2006, ―Democracy and Elections in Africa,‖ Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
90 
 
Nordhaus, W., ―The political business cycle‖, Review of Economic Studies, 1975, pp. 
169-190. 
Pritchett, L., 2001, ―Where Has All the Education Gone?‖ World Bank Economic 
Review 15(3): 367-391. 
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Arvind Subramanian, 2005, Aid and Growth: What Does 
the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show? IMF Working Paper 05/127 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
Rodrik, D., 2005, ―Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on 
Policies (http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/policy%20regressions.pdf). 
Rodrik, D., (editor), 2003, ―In Search for Prosperity: Analytical Narrative on 
Economic Growth,‖ Princeton University Press. 
Rodrik, D., 1996, ―Understanding Economic Policy Reform,‖ Journal of Economic 
Literature 34, pp. 9-41. 
Rogoff, K., ―Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles‖, The American Economic Review, 
Vol 80, March 1990, pp 21-36. 
Roll, R., and Talbott, J., 2003, ―Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and 
Prosperity,‖ Journal of Democracy 14, No. 3, pp 75-89. 
Sachs, J., 2005, ―The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time,‖ Penguin 
Press. 
Sandbrook, R., 1985, ―The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation,‖ Cambridge 
University Press. 
Senhadji, Abdelhak, 1999, Sources of Economic Growth: An Extensive Growth 
Accounting Exercise, IMF Working Paper 99/77 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund). 
Shi, M., and Svensson, J., 2002, ―Political budget cycles in developed and developing 
countries‖, working paper, IIES, Stockholm University. 
Wade, R., 1990, ―Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization,‖ Princeton University Press. 
Walle, N.,2001, ―African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-
1999‖ Cambridge University Press. 
World Bank, 2008, ―Policy Plus: African Growth Performance 1960-2000 in The 
Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960–2000, ed. by Benno J. Ndulu, 
Stephen A. O’Connell, Jean-Paul Azam, Robert H. Bates, Augustin K. Fosu, Jan 
91 
 
Willem Gunning, and Dominique Njinkeu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
(http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/soconne1/documents/Chap1_BNSOC.pdf). 
World Bank, 2000, ―Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?‖ Washington, DC.  
Young, C., 1994, ―The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective,‖ 
BookCrafters, Inc., Chelsea, Michigan. 
